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Abstract  
The accident analysis of SBIRS program is conducted by gathering information for 15 years 
to understand the cause of the accident. The program had series of failures, workarounds 
were developed incrementally to solve the incidental problems over the years. This resulted 
in major failure in thermal vacuum testing. The architecture was reassessed, the new 
architecture so adopted was the wrong architecture. This is the accident this research has 
analyzed. The cause of the accident is analyzed thoroughly to understand the circumstances 
in which such an architecture was adopted. 
A System analysis of the environment was conducted to understand the accident 
circumstances and an accident analysis was conducted to understand the influence of the 
systemic failures of the wrong architectural decision which is the accident analyzed. A 
comparative study of accident analysis methodologies was undertaken to derive the best-
suited method for accident analysis. A systemic accident analysis method STAMP, which 
analyses the accidents caused by the influence of the environment was considered as the best 
fit. 
The STAMP accident analysis method was adopted to understand the accident in detail. The 
accident analysis was performed based on the reports gathered from GAO, DOD and other 
sources and was confirmed for its completeness and accuracy from GAO. STPA process was 
adopted to conduct accident analysis in three stages – identifying control structures, changes 
in control structures and dynamic process model. STAMP accident analysis was improved 
by adding context as an additional factor. 
Accidents with context as the cause of the accident were analyzed to understand the possible 
solutions. The realization of the importance of context as accident cause was understood and 
the need to enhance the accident analysis model was realized. By adding context as part of 
the process that needs to be transferred to ensure successful completion was suggested. An 
organizational model that has been successful in assessing the accidents due to the context 
in the different domain was studied and was suggested to be adopted as preventive accident 
analysis model. Finally, the wrong architectural decision being the accident is contested and 
argued as the accident, as currently such decisions are not considered as an accident in the 
industry. 
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This research has identified the cause of the accident to be the context in which organizations 
were operating. The solution suggested is to stabilize the context in one organization and 
replicate the stabilized context around the organizations involved in the program. The 
solution identifies contextual enhancement techniques used in health and safety management 
to build a positive culture in the organization. 
Thus this research has contributed towards analyzing the architectural failure in SBIRS 
program by identifying an accident analysis method that best suits the case study, applied 
the accident analysis to the case study to understand the cause of the accident. A 
recommendation of enhancing the factors in accident analysis was suggested and an accident 
prevention technique was recommended and a process to adopt this technique was suggested. 
This research has led to two further recommendations for future work. An architectural 
technique which would create the framework of components to prevent future architectural 
accidents such as this case study will be followed up. And a process to successfully pass the 
context in order to prevent accidents caused by organizational context will be taken further.  
This research is structured to understand the problem, analyze the problem using specific 
accident analysis methodology related to the domain detailing the accident, comparing 
different domains with the similar accident cause and finally recommending an accident 
prevention technique which had been successful in organizations. 
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Thesis Structure – Thematic outline 
Change management is a continuous assessment process. Most organizations face the 
problem of adopting and adapting to the change. The change in the SBIRS case study is to 
adopt the new architecture of single core processor. This research is to argue that new 
architecture so adopted is the failure of the change management process. 
Software architecture accident analysis.  Architecture is the initial phase of the 
development cycle, where the system of identifying the solution is performed to the best 
efficiency by drawing a plan. This case study has failed to draw a successful plan for the 
development of flight software which has resulted in major failure whereby the entire 
process of architectural planning had to be repeated. The new architecture was still a failure 
plan.   
Accident analysis is undertaken when the end result is successful. The end result of the 
program governs the initiation of accident analysis. The successful completion is considered 
as an overall success of the program. In this case study the SBIRS program had success 
outcome, so the program was not assessed for the failures that this program had gone 
through. This case study was chosen to understand the failures to learn from them even when 
the end result of the program is successful. 
Accident analysis is not undertaken in the industry. In general, accident analysis is 
considered only when there is a loss of life or a huge loss of resources. Software industry 
like government services, which is reliant on software services for its operational success, 
lacks knowledge to understand the complexities that the software imparts to their main 
stream failures. These failures are normally not dug deep, efforts are to blame the software 
process. There are many software process improvements over the years but the architecture 
of software is never blamed. There is no prominence given to accidents that are due to 
architecture as it is the decisions taken at the very start. The accident analysis is to identify 
the failures and to learn from them. In this case study, the loss is time, cost and software 
architecture. The software architecture is the cause of failures that had followed with defects 
and redesign efforts. 
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Industry gap. There needs to be a strict architectural framework for the software applications 
to formulate a well interacting successful software to be delivered on time and in the budget. 
This case study has conducted accident analysis to learn from the failures of architecture 
which has led to huge loss of money and loss of time. In order to solve this problem, an 
architectural framework which holds the components with their pre-defined interaction and 
policies that govern entry and exit criteria to this framework is suggested. 
Accident Prevention techniques. “Blue Print” of software architectural framework which 
holds the components with the interactions assembled and their foundations laid for the 
choice of technologies to bounce against a strong framework with is an attempt to prevent 
accidents due to architectural failures. STAMP accident identification factors were enhanced 
to include context as a factor to be analyzed. A preventive technique of successful context 
is distributed among the organizations to prevent accidents such as this case study. 
Identification of causes of the accident. The case study has undertaken accident analysis to 
understand the causes of the failures leading to the accident. The cause of the accident in the 
case study was analyzed as the ‘context’ of the organizations involved. The failures were 
due to initiatives brought in the SBIRS program and this change process was not 
continuously monitored which resulted in the architectural failures and subsequently resulted 
in adopting an architecture with single core processor which would lead to failures in future. 
Analysis of accident (process). The case study has gathered information for 15 years of this 
program to understand the accident circumstances. The analysis of the program was 
conducted with GAO’s participation in assisting the research by validating the information 
gathered for analyzing the cause of the accident. NASA had guided the research by providing 
detailed architectural evolution history and validating the recommendations put forward in 
this research. 
Literature review. The information was gathered from GAO, DOD, SBIRS program office, 
Under secretary’s office for Defense, Lockheed Martin, Airforce, NASA GSFC, NASA JPL 
and published news articles. NASA had provided the latest architectural documents and 
historical perspective of failures discussed in the Software Architecture Review Board 
(SARB). 
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Methodology – STAMP. This case study was reviewed with the STAMP methodology to 
understand the failures that led to the accident of adopting a wrong architecture of single 
core processor. 
The environment of SBIRS program. This case study has analyzed the SBIRS program with 
a vision of identifying the influencing factors of the development lifecycle of the flight 
software. The organizations involved were facing problems due to the pressure of 
stakeholders, political influences,  military constraints, contractors,  coordination problems, 
relaxed procedures and many new changes brought forward to influence the outcome which 
led to failures to cope with the changes were studied. 
Architectural failures. This case study has analyzed many architectural failures in the 
program to understand the circumstances in which the architectural decision of adopting 
single core architecture for flight software was recommended. This is the accident this 
research has analyzed.  
SBIRS program.   This case study has brought forward interaction failures between the 
organizations involved,   coordination failures,  change initiatives, requirements problems, 
architectural problems, design problems, test problems,  assurance problems, budget 
problems, planning of project  problems,   military standards causing problems, lapse in 
adhering to the military standards,  process failures, waivers,  environment to encourage 
lethargy,  short-term cover-ups – workarounds, cost escalations and delayed schedules.  The 
encouraging factor to choose this case study was the architectural failure which was 
astonishing to see the SBIRS program adopt single core processor for flight software 
architecture which is the primitive stage of the architectural design. 
This research is structured to show the effect of changes in the continuous assessment 
process in the SBIRS program analysis section by explaining the problems in the 
environment and the failures in software architecture as the architecture that is considered 
as an accident is shown in Accident analysis section explaining the details of the accident 
that is examined in Chapter II. The accidents that occur when the resultant is a success are 
not studied, so this case study has studied the accidents that had resulted in success. In order 
to understand such accidents, a methodology is chosen. The methodologies pertinent to this 
accident analysis is analyzed for relevance to this case study in Chapter I.   
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The accident is not considered as an accident, in this case study the architectural failure is 
considered as an accident. Accident analysis of the case study is conducted for the 
architectural accident using STAMP accident analysis where the cause of the accident is 
derived from the systematic analysis of the accident. It is argued as an accident in chapter 
V. 
The industry has a gap in the prevention technique for accidents that are caused by the 
context. So a prevention technique is to be formulated. An enhancement to the STAMP 
model is suggested for analyzing the accidents with the context as one of the factors to be 
considered while analyzing accidents in Chapter III. 
The cause of the accident was analyzed for the influence of the change process over the 
system. A recommendation for accident prevention for the failures due to contextual factors 
are analyzed in Chapter IV. The accident was highlighted to GAO. A detailed overview of 
why such an accident is considered is explained in Chapter V. The architectural accident is 
the sole cause of the failures in this program. This research has led to future research 
recommendations which are detailed. An analysis of GAO’s recommendations to this 
research is appended in Appendix.
Introduction  
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Introduction 
The software industry has seen many failures in the software development in terms of 
meeting the requirements, cost overruns and schedule delays. Software development has 
been unpredictable in terms of development, performance, integration, and utilization of 
software for the intended need. The assured quality of the software is always in question, the 
quality of the software is unpredictable. Failures in software development need to be 
analyzed for improving the quality, predictability, and delivery on time. 
The software industry has to learn from failures to improve on meeting the expectations of 
the stakeholders. To achieve this, accident analysis has to be performed to understand the 
failures of software to match the expectations. Accident analysis is considered as a process 
to be conducted after the accident has occurred. There is no accident analysis undertaken in 
software industry unless the result of the project is a failure. As a result, most of the accidents 
go unnoticed and there is no knowledge gained as the resultant of the project dominates the 
initiation of accident analysis. In this case study accident analysis is performed even when 
the end result of the program was successful and the accident was not noticed.  
In general software architecture is not blamed for wrong decisions adopted. The blame is 
borne by other teams such as development and test teams. In this case study, it is been argued 
that the choice of single-core architecture was not the right decision. An accident analysis is 
conducted to understand the importance of architectural decisions in the success of the 
project. The decision of adopting single core architecture was to see the failure that will 
definitely occur to consume more resources, for the time to shed light on this failure which 
might have caused enormous loss of time, money and quality by evolving through the fault 
initiated at the architectural phase. 
STAMP accident analysis is adopted in the case study to show the success of the preventive 
accident analysis. As the change is a continuous process, organizations should assess the 
organizational context continually to avoid loss of resources. A process to assess the 
organizational context is suggested which is based on the proven technique used by Health 
and Safety organization. This case study was adopted to prove that the failures have to be 
analyzed to learn from, even if the final outcome is successful. 
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SBIRS program had been restructured several times due to schedule delays and cost 
increases resulting in revised program goals in 2002, 2004 and 2005.[GAO, 2008] There 
were many challenges in the program due to technologies and software. This research is to 
understand the successes and flaws in the system to navigate through the deep sea 
successfully as this program had managed to fly high in 2011[Mccaney, 2014]by 
successfully launching the first GEO 1 satellite with higher performance 
efficiency[LockheedMartin, 2012]. 
The concerns were due to architectural failures leading to defects which resulted in a 
tremendous amount of pressure on the development team and operations team to hold the 
bag for the failed architecture. In 2007 GEO satellite underwent thermal vacuum testing and 
had major failures due to architectural issues[GAO, 2008]. This failure was deducted after 
12 years of program inception[GAO, 2008]. There were many interim architectural issues 
found in different stages of the program, there were workarounds[GAO, 2003] developed to 
have temporary relief from the situation which had mounted up to this stage of thermal 
vacuum test failure in 2007[GAO, 2008]. At this stage of the program, there had not been 
any way out of the situation as there were defects mounting from every component planned 
to be developed in flight software. The only way out was to redesign the software 
architecture with all the defects encountered resolved in the new design. 
The redesign effort undertaken was after a thorough analysis of the architectural problems, 
to climb out of the issues already presented due to architectural problems and to build a safe 
architecture, the architecture was to place all the software components in one 
processor[GAO, 2008]. This approach is questioned in this research as it was a wrong 
decision to go back to the primitive stage of architectural design. The earlier version of the 
architecture was to have flight software deployed in two processors having the advantage of 
the distributed system. 
Although this architecture with the new design could have resulted in another catastrophe, 
fortunately, there seems to be an explosion in the evolution of architecture after this stage 
which resulted in using advanced architectural principles in flight software. The flight 
software in the current state is in a distributed system with Mission Data Systems 
architectural[Feller, Gluch, and Woodham, 2010] approach along with core Flight Software 
systems[Mccomas, 2012] approach which is widely appreciated for its achievements  in 
architectural success beyond measure of any successes this project might have had in the 
history of space systems. 
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This research is structured initially to identify an accident which did not result in final failure. 
The failure had taken the toll by wasting resources, time, and quality of the software. The 
identification of accident is understood in the context of other organizational failures in 
Section 2.1. The accident context is explained in the Section 2.2. The architectural failures 
are not considered as accidents, so this research has identified this architectural failure by 
surveying various other methodologies of identifying the cause of the accident in the Chapter 
I  Comparative study of  accident methodologies. As the accident is architectural, this 
accident has the preset context of failures in the program, this accident needs to be analyzed 
with a methodology which comprehends the architectural context along with the wider 
program context. A systemic method was adopted to analyze this accident using STAMP 
accident model in the Section 3.1. 
 As STAMP, is a hierarchical model, this accident is considered as spread over different 
areas of concerns, were the hierarchical model is the right model to be chosen with contextual 
factors being analyzed in a systematic manner using STPA process in the Section 3.2. The 
architectural accident is detailed for the accident analysis in the Section 3.3. The hierarchical 
levels of control are identified which were responsible for the architectural accident detailed 
in the section 3.4.1. The change is a continuous process which was not adapted to by the 
program and the failures in adaptation was the resultant of the architectural accident which 
is detailed in the section 3.4.2 Changes in Control structure leading up to the Accident. As 
all organizations are in a dynamic equilibrium in response to the change, the dynamic context 
would depict the actual cause of the accident which is detailed in the section 3.4.3. 
The findings of dynamic context are realized as an unusual cause of the accident, so other 
accidents which had similar cause were analyzed in the section 3.4.4 “Context” As Cause of 
Accident in other case studies. It was understood that other accidents have also not initiated 
any prevention techniques, so an accident prevention technique is suggested in the section 
3.4.5. It is realized that this accident cause is not been learned from, which leads to a 
worrisome outlook to be continued even with this accident, so a prevention process is 
suggested to adopt the accident prevention technique recommended in the Chapter IV. 
The architecture is considered to be the accident as it would lead to further loss of resources 
and time, this is argued in the Chapter V. This research has resulted in an invention of a 
prevention technique as “Blue Print” of architecture and a process to adopt the change as 
detailed in the section Recommendations for Future Work. The detailed process of accident 
analysis is explained further. 
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STAMP analysis takes step by step analysis of the accident. The first stage of analysis is to 
understand the hierarchy of control structures involved in the accident. The next stage of the 
accident analysis is to understand the flaws in the process and enforcement of constraints. 
The motivation to change and to adopt by the organization to the control constraints is also 
analyzed here. The next stage is to map every deviation in the whole system, analyze the 
effects of one system over other, how each system had contributed towards creating an 
expectation of conformity to the overall norm. This norm is identified as the cause of the 
accident. In STAMP analysis, a detailed accident analysis is undertaken while considering 
the whole context of the accident.  
STAMP analysis had brought forward an intrinsic factor of the change process by decoupling 
every aspect of the accident in a systematic process of revelation as we walk through it. This 
revelation had been a shock at every stage in the process of accident analysis. As it reveals 
its true self, has an enormous world opening up in front of the STAMP process which 
encourages accident analysts to understand intricate aspects of the STAMP analysis. This 
revelation does bring forward one’s self-image to the level of self-actualization which 
promotes utilization of every resource that had been gathered over the run which increases 
one’s knowledge about the accident. STAMP analysis is one which has erupted the cause of 
the accident to this state.   
This research has contributed to identifying the accident among a huge pile of information 
on different organizations involved. This accident had gone unnoticed and was never 
analyzed, as failure was not the end result. The accident was analyzed using STAMP 
analysis, after understanding the different techniques used in accident analysis. The cause of 
the accident was found to be the context of the organization in which it was operating. 
This research has analyzed various failures in the program, along with schedule delays and 
cost overruns. This research has chosen to analyze the accident at the point of the thermal 
vacuum test failure in 2007. After this major failure, the architecture was reassessed in the 
light of all the failures thus far, and in an attempt to solve all the problems by simplifying 
the architecture, the architecture with single core processor and applications deployed were 
not on distributed architecture was adopted. This has arisen the accident of not adopting 
multicore architecture and distributed application architecture. The accident here is the 
adoption of wrong architecture. 
Introduction  
Sujatha Mohanram Post Graduate Research 18 
A prevention technique is recommended which had been successfully implemented in other 
domains. This prevention technique is thoroughly analyzed to understand the factors 
involved in the accident are prevented. The process of adopting this prevention technique is 
also detailed to continuously improve the context. This adoption of prevention technique is 
new to this domain and has been recommended from the theoretical perspective. 
This thesis is structured to reveal the accident of SBIRS program analysis in the second 
chapter, a comparative study of accident analysis methodologies is undertaken to understand 
the various approaches to the accident analysis in the first chapter, STAMP analysis is 
undertaken for SBIRS project in the third chapter, the recommendations from the accident 
analysis is suggested in chapter four and the Architectural failure is explained in the fifth 
chapter.  
In the next chapter, an analysis of methodology to be adapted to perform the accident 
analysis is discussed. This methodology has to highlight the flaws in the system and bring 
the actual facts of the accident to light. These methodologies have specific strengths in the 
analysis of the accident, so a thorough analysis of the accident analysis methodologies is 
undertaken to understand best-suited methodology to this accident scenario. 
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Chapter I Comparative study of  accident methodologies 
Rasmussen in the context of risk management has asked whether ‘we actually have adequate 
models of accident causation in the present dynamic society?’ He argues for a ‘model of 
behavior shaping mechanisms in terms of work system constraints, boundaries of acceptable 
performance and subjective criteria guiding adaptation to change’ [Feller, Gluch, and 
Woodham, 2010]. The adequacy and suitability of accident investigation models continue to 
be open for academic deliberation. 
Accident analysis could be analyzed under traditional accident analysis and modern accident 
analysis.  The accident analysis methodologies will be analyzed to understand the most 
appropriate model to implement in the case study. The case study is based on architectural 
accident being developed in a complex environment. As the complexity is projected at the 
very on-sight of the accident, the complete analysis of the history was required to understand 
the causes of the accident.  The accident had unbelievable scope to the architectural analysis, 
which generated the interest to delve deeper to understand the very scope of the accident. 
This accident analysis is done for the period of 15 years, understanding what happened 
during this period to lead to such an accident creating a wider context for the accident.  
1.1 Traditional Accident Analysis Methods 
An example of King’s Cross underground station fire accident will be considered to analyze 
various methods to understand the applicability of SBIRS case study. 
King’s Cross Underground station fire accident 
“While several minor escalator fires had occurred previously and had been investigated, 
apparently no one in the organization seriously considered the fact that a major escalator 
fire was a possibility – consequently, as the inquiry states, little effective action had been 
taken on the warnings provided by the minor fires. Similarly, the inquiry also reported that 
there were serious flaws in the managerial and organizational responsibilities and 
accountability for safety with virtually all aspects of the organization thinking passenger 
safety was someone else’s responsibility.” - Department of Transport (1988), Investigation 
into the Kings Cross Underground Fire, London: HMSO 
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1.1.1 Sequential Event based Models  
Sequential event-based model is based on the sequence of events to deduce the causal factor 
from the five sequences, social environment (those conditions allow to take risks); the fault 
of the person; unsafe acts or conditions (poor planning, unsafe environment, hazardous 
environment); accident; and injury (Figure 1). The model depicts only single cause for an 
accident whereas accidents normally have multiple factors[Qureshi, 2008]. 
 
Figure 1 Sequential event-based model [Qureshi, 2008] 
In King’s cross accident, domino theory which advocates single cause for an accident is 
proven inadequate. There were multiple causes of failures to this accident such as 
management’s inadequate action, inadequate preventive measures undertaken after the 
minor fire accidents, etc. 
1.1.2 Time-ordered chain of events model 
Events based on time are recorded as a linear model, they are ordered based on time and the 
event before the accident is blamed as the cause of the accident (Figure 2). This is not 
appropriate as there could be many reasons for the accident[Qureshi, 2008]. 
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Figure 2 Time ordered chain of events model [Qureshi, 2008] 
In King’s cross accident, there were multiple sequences of events which related to the cause 
of the accident. Such as unsafe act of a person in the lift, managerial incompetency to 
safeguard the welfare of the passengers, etc. This proves that the previous stage before the 
accident cannot be the only cause of the accident. 
1.1.3 Risk Analysis Model 
1.1.3.1 Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault tree analysis is a predictive hazard analysis tool to determine the hazardous situation 
at a given point in time. Fault tree model is a snapshot of the state of the system at a given 
time (Figure 3), but it does not convey any notion of time delay or time ordering[Qureshi, 
2008]. 
 
Figure 3 Fault Tree Analysis[Qureshi, 2008] 
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In King’s cross accident, a major fire in the lift is a top-level event and the lowest order event 
would be the actual cause of the fire (cigarette bud). As this model does not convey the 
notion of time delays like time to fetch the fire extinguisher or time delay in spreading of the 
fire, decisions taken at the wrong time would lead to unpredictable results. 
1.1.3.2 Failure Modes Effects Analysis 
Failure modes effects analysis uses forward search based on event chain model when 
initiating events are the cause of the accident (Figure 4). Failure modes effects model does 
not consider all the events in a collective manner, they are treated as individual 
failures[Qureshi, 2008]. 
 
Figure 4 Failure Modes Effects Analysis [Toolbook et al., 2017] 
In the King’s cross accident, there were many failures like grease left unnoticed, 
organizational safety measures were not followed, etc. which would lead to different 
initiating events (Figure 4) leading to failures. As each failure is considered individually, 
collective failure resulting out of failures are not considered. 
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1.2 Modern Approaches to Accident Modelling 
1.2.1 Charles Perrow’s Seminal Model 
The main basis of the accident is complex interactions and tight coupling. So the accident 
analysis analyses the characteristic that makes more prone to the accidents. This accident 
model considers the multiple accident causes as failures and tightly coupled system that are 
very dependent on the interacting systems and would have an adverse effect on the 
interacting components (Figure 5). As every system is different and does not comply with 
the norms of this model[Qureshi, 2008]. 
 
Figure 5 Charles Perrow’s Seminal Model[Qureshi, 2008] 
In King’s cross accident, the tight coupling of the systems like, maintenance of the lift which 
led to the grease left behind, emergency procedures not properly adopted, etc. are tightly 
linked to having the adverse effects on the system to cause an accident. The accident 
methodology could not be used for all systems as every system is different within the King’s 
cross accident. 
1.2.2 Reason’s Organizational Model of System Accidents 
An accident is the interaction of the components where the environment in which it is 
operating cause the failure when it is destabilized. The cause of the accident is generally that 
interacts with the system. The dynamics of the system is represented in the form of barriers 
and safeguards. These barriers support each other as a support mechanism. The Swiss cheese 
model shows holes in the barriers as accident causes (Figure 6).  
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The accident is depicted as holes in the barriers of cheese when they line up in all layers to 
cause an accident which does not provide all the causes of the accident and their 
combinations to result in an accident. This accident model projects only high level of 
analysis of contributory factors in an accident. Reason’s model shows a static view of the 
organization, whereas the failures are transient i.e. the holes in Swiss cheese are continuously 
moving[Qureshi, 2008]. 
 
Figure 6 Reason’s organizational model of system accidents[Qureshi, 2008] 
In King’s cross accident, the barriers are the maintenance of lift which had grease, the hole 
in the barrier would be that it was not cleaned, organizational responsibility would be a 
barrier and hole in the barrier would be that safety measures were not put in place. These 
barriers and holes in the barriers may not line up if analyzed after there is a situation change, 
if the maintenance team would have cleaned the grease but if the nature of cleaning was not 
specified in the manual, then the holes in the barriers would shift or it might even shift the 
barrier if the training had not been provided at all by personnel development team. Thus this 
model does not take into account the dynamic nature of the accident. 
1.2.3 Reason’s model and event chain model 
The accidents in socio-technical systems are a combination of factors meshed into the 
complex causal network with hierarchical levels in an organization. The technical and 
organizational issues need to be simultaneously considered. This integration of Reason’s and 
the event chain model provides the lineup of the holes to formulate fault, error, and failure 
of the accident between system layers (Figure 7) [Qureshi, 2008]. 
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Figure 7 Reason’s model and event chain model[Qureshi, 2008] 
In King’s cross accident, there were many event chains that could be created with Swiss 
cheese model and collated to form fault-error-failure model. But the model is not holistic in 
approach and linear which fails to incorporate intermediary failures that did not line up.  
1.2.4 Systemic Accident Models 
The systemic view is considered where the accident is analyzed for the whole system. Thus 
the accident arises from the degraded interaction between the systems. The system is 
considered as a dynamic process which continuously changes in response to the 
environment. Thus accidents are treated as flawed processes and interaction problems in 
STAMP accident model. Rasmussen considers the contextual factors involved in the 
organization that creates preconditions for accidents[Qureshi, 2008]. 
1.2.5 Cognitive systems engineering approach 
Cognitive systems engineering takes into account the context in which human and machine 
interact. It is an understanding of how human and machine function together in the 
environment than how they interact with each other. Two systemic accident models are 
developed: Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method; and the Functional Resonance 
Accident Model. Cognitive Reliability considers human errors in the accident analysis. 
Functional Resonance model considers the system components that interact with the 
environmental factors to create an accident[Qureshi, 2008]. 
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1.3 Rasmussen’s Sociotechnical Framework for Risk 
Management 
1.3.1 Structural Hierarchy and System Dynamics 
This model evaluates the hierarchical structures and their adaptation to the context over time. 
When this adaptation evolves, the components in the model might get out of the boundaries 
resulting in an accident (Figure 8). This adaptation at every level of the hierarchy would 
collectively result in a synergetic effect towards the accident. These boundaries for every 
hierarchy and every actor had to be established and their boundaries have to be secured and 
guarded for any breach[Qureshi, 2008]. 
 
Figure 8 Structural Hierarchy and System Dynamics[Qureshi, 2008] 
 
In King’s cross accident, maintenance team would form the lowest hierarchy, these 
hierarchies have to be clearly defined. Then identification of boundaries of safe operations 
would be required. These boundaries have to be made visible to each actor and these should 
be controllable by the actors. 
 
Comparative study of  accident methodologies | Rasmussen’s Sociotechnical Framework for Risk 
Management 
Sujatha Mohanram Post Graduate Research 27 
1.3.2 AcciMap Accident Analysis Technique 
AcciMap follows the Hierarchical structure of Rasmussen’s framework. It describes the 
information flow in the entire system (Figure 9 ). This model identifies the interaction flaws 
between the decision makers and the events leading to accident[Qureshi, 2008]. This model 
is a linear representation of causal factors which restricts the accident analysis by evaluating 
the accident in one single area of concern.  
 
Figure 9 AcciMap Accident Analysis Technique[Qureshi, 2008] 
In the King’s cross accident, AcciMap each causal chain of events are mapped, then patterns 
of accidents related to a particular system are analyzed using cause sequence analysis. Set 
of events are determined by the choice of critical event from cause sequence chart. The 
critical event that connects the causal tree (potential causes) with the accidents. A vertical 
analysis of hierarchical levels is conducted which results in an AcciMap as shown in Figure 
10. 
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Figure 10 Kings Cross Fire Accident 
In Figure 10, each critical event is represented with sample vertical flow. In reality, there 
would be multiple AcciMaps created for every critical event and an InfoMap is generated to 
identify failures in communication between the actors.  
AcciMap has a linear approach to the analysis of the accident. AcciMap’s linearity causes 
loss of cross causal factor references in identifying the cause of the accident as shown in 
Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11 King’s Cross fire accident – cross causal factor relations 
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1.4 System Theoretic Accident Model And Process  
STAMP analyses the accident as interaction among the components and the faults that are 
not adequately handled by the control structures resulting in an accident. This model 
considers the context of the interaction among the components (Figure 12) and when the 
safety boundaries are violated among the components, accidents occur. STAMP analysis 
identifies other causal factors such as environmental factors, other actors and their role in 
accident scenario[Qureshi, 2008]. So STAMP was adopted to the case study to analyze the 
complex architectural accident in the next section. 
 
Figure 12 STAMP component interaction context 
An example of Walkerton water contamination accident is provided in Figure 13 STAMP 
implementation shows control structures (components) and constraint failures (contextual 
interaction failures). 
In King’s cross accident, control structures would be Maintenance department, Underground 
Management, etc. and constraint failures would be, no safety measures were in place. Thus 
STAMP analysis clearly illustrates the interaction failures.  
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Figure 13 STAMP analysis of Walkerton water contamination accident[Leveson et al., 2003] 
The comparative study of Traditional Accident analysis had considered the single cause of 
the accident and in the current systems, the complexity of interactions are shown to have 
multiple causes of the accident. In Modern approaches, an evolution of accident analysis has 
attempted to incorporate multiple causes, while decoupling the system complexity. From 
Charles Perrow’s model to Reason’s model, consideration of multiple causal factors had 
been adopted. Systemic accident models which had incorporated to understand the systemic 
view of the accident along with the dynamic context. 
Rasmussen’s sociotechnical model had created hierarchical structures to understand the 
failures in the system. STAMP had broken the hierarchical taxonomy or classification of the 
structure into components (control structures) to understand the component failures 
(constraint) and interaction failures. The STAMP analysis analyses the systems 
(components) in a systemic manner to reveal many failures as the cause of the accident. The 
model depicts the evolution of the system over time to degrade and become the failure cause. 
The model considers missing components which could have contributed to the failure. As 
STAMP has shown systemic approach to the accident and evolution of accidents over time, 
this model is preferred to analyze SBIRS accident.  
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A detailed overview of the STAMP analysis methodology and process is explained in the 
next chapter. STAMP is implemented in SBIRS case study to understand the missing and 
failed components and interactions. 
1.5 Formal Methods for Accident Analysis 
Formal methods are means to describe the accident with accuracy and completeness of the 
accident to understand all the possible risks that will lead to accidents in order to prevent 
future failures. The accidents analyzed has a moral responsibility to ensure that information 
presented should conform to the standardized methodology[Qureshi, 2008]. Burns provides 
various factors that might influence the accident analysis: Size of the accident which might 
have an adverse effect on the analysis causing ambiguity and omissions; Structure of the 
accident analysis could also lead to confusion; Validation will not be possible if a systematic 
approach is not adopted and the quality of analysis may not be consistent which might lead 
to sidetrack the analysis from the real problem; Differing viewpoints may cause chaos, thus 
a standardized methodology will help structure the accident analysis in a positive way; 
Redundancy of evidence in a particular area which may not have influenced the accident 
may gain importance if a  strict methodology is not followed; Imprecision may lead to 
repetition of accident and further loss. Accidents should be interpreted in the same way by 
everybody for that a methodology is adopted to ensure consistency of approach and analysis 
of the accident; Concurrency is important as accidents may occur simultaneously at various 
places and cumulative effect should be taken into account on top of multiple causes of 
accident; Distinguishing Prescriptive and Descriptive Behavior of the accident may cause 
influence on the analysis by providing prejudice to the analysis thus preventing right 
prevention action to be taken; Incompleteness might lead to misinterpretations of the 
accident; Politics of Inquiries may influence the accident analysis in an adverse way, as the 
real cause could be hidden; Domain related accident methodologies which follow the 
regulations could also have adverse effects when there is no specific proven methodology to 
follow in accident analysis[Qureshi, 2008]. 
Accident analysis methodology promotes rigorous reasoning and precision by the 
methodical construction of formal models which improves accuracy and consistency of 
accident analysis. An accident analysis should understand the accident and learn from it to 
prevent future accidents, which encourages identifying all the factors and different 
perspectives of the flawed processes underlying an accident and ensure that the factual data 
is interpreted. 
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Effective accident analysis should focus on social and organizational factors in accidents, 
system accidents and software errors, human error, and adaptation over time for failure 
events and reliability engineering techniques to prevent accidents[Leveson, 2004]. 
A methodology is required to structure the accident analysis. The methodology ensures the 
accidents to be effectively analyzed. An accident analysis has a moral responsibility to 
generate right cause for the accident so that the preventive measures could be taken to 
prevent future failures. A methodology should be proven over the years to adapt the accident 
analysis based on the methodology in order to attain consistency and accuracy. So the 
domain related accident analysis methodologies were analyzed for adaptability to this 
accident scenario.  
STAMP analysis is a systemic theory where accidents occur due to external disturbances, 
component failures or dysfunctional interactions among system components, inadequate 
control or enforcement of constraints on the development, design, and operation of the 
system[Leveson, 2004]. In STAMP, the system is a dynamic process with interrelated 
components that have information flow and control that continually adapts to the changes in 
itself and its environment[Leveson, 2004]. Thus the accident is described as an adaptive 
system that fails to meet the complex system goals and values over time due to inadequate 
control mechanism[Leveson, 2004]. 
In the King’s cross accident, the fire started in the escalator and as a consequence of 
management failure to prevent this accident 31 people were killed.  STAMP analysis of this 
accident would include Maintenance department, Development and training department, 
Policies department, Health and Safety organization, etc. that would formulate the 
hierarchical levels of control structures and the interaction flaws would be that Maintenance 
department did not advise the employees to maintain the escalator using a set protocol.  
Management of Underground did not assess the situation after the minor fires to take 
preventive action. These failures in interaction would be due to the Maintenance department 
(controller) that may have issued inadequate or inappropriate control action, including 
inadequate handling of failures, the Maintenance department might have inadequately 
actioned the protocol or there may be a missing structure such as cleaning grease might not 
have been part their protocol.  
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In the chain of events approach, the next proximate structure would be blamed for the cause 
of the accident. In this scenario, maintenance department would be blamed for not 
maintaining the escalator, which would not be an appropriate causal factor. 
STAMP analysis has helped in separating the factual data from the assumptions and presents 
a clear and concise picture of the accident from all the controller’s interactions as the analysis 
is based on identifying the controllers, their interactions, and the control mechanisms as the 
first phase of the accident analysis. The behavioral dynamics underlying the change in 
control mechanisms in the next phase identifies the missing structures or constraints. To 
understand the dynamics of the entire system, by collating the failures at each component 
that led to the accident is clearly projected in the final phase of the STAMP model. 
The control structure models the non-linear relationships reflecting the behavioral dynamics 
controlling the behavior of entire organizational structure over time[Leveson, 2004]. Thus 
STAMP is based on a system theory, where components are considered as control structures 
and each control structure exercises controlling interactions on others, the accident is 
understood as component failures, dysfunctional interactions among components and 
environmental disturbances[Leveson, 2004].  
STAMP analysis has adopted STPA process in structuring the accident analysis, thereby 
ensuring consistency in the validation of the model for concurrency where factual data is 
analyzed by wading through interpreted data, where analysis of contextual behavioral 
adoptions to change is assessed in the dynamic perspective of the evolution of the 
constraints, missing control structures are identified, data gathered is thorough from the 
process perspective as the model encourages identification of data from controller’s 
perspective, constraint’s perspective and the missing component’s perspective and as the 
model is encompassing systemic changes in the organization, the politics of inquiries are 
handled by itself as STAMP has been widely used in software industry.  
Thus STAMP is considered to be a formal method of Systemic Accident models.  STAMP 
accident analysis is adopted for this case study as detailed in the chapter 3. In order to 
understand the wider context, the accident analysis has gathered information about the 
program context to evaluate the accident context in the wider perspective in the next section. 
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Chapter II  SBIRS program Analysis  
2.1 System analysis 
SBIRS program analysis in this section will detail the current system which was the resultant 
of the redesign effort undertaken, in spite of good processes adopted this program was not 
able to make use of it in attaining higher performance in satellite development and 
enhancements in various stages of development, test and launch capabilities. Although this 
program stands as success strategy for other programs to follow, it has been through difficult 
stages in its life cycle. SBIRS program was the first to adopt new program initiatives, so 
there were initial problems with effective implementation, this program has overtime 
successfully molded itself to derive better results from the program initiatives. This program 
has learned to improve the efficiency and had reduced the cost effectively by inclusive 
stakeholders, but time had taken its toll. The SBIRS program’s effective processes that were 
adopted and had taken the experience of the project to improve and excel to break open from 
the bureaucratic bonds are discussed in detail in this section. 
SBIRS program is an Infrared Sensing system which provides sensing ability to detect 
threats with accuracy and in time. SBIRS program is developed in two systems. The System 
with Control Segment and User Segment, which provides integration with existing DSP 
satellites to provide current military capability[SBIRS, 2013]. And the System that includes 
a space segment consisting of two hosted payloads in HEO and four satellites in 
geosynchronous orbit. This system provides ground system software and hardware for 
consolidated data processing across all sensor families[SBIRS, 2013]. 
The space system with both ground system software and space system has been in the orbit 
with two HEO payloads and two GEO satellites and additional GEO satellites will be 
launched in phases over next few years [SBIRS, 2013]. The ground systems software and 
hardware will be replaced in blocks completing in 2018 as Missile Defense mission 
performance was improved by integrating GEO-1. Technical intelligence and battlespace 
awareness missions were functional and effective, as it provided increased revisit rate and 
more data thereby more efficient in identifying target missile. [SBIRS, 2013]. 
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Following numerous delays caused by software malfunctions and other hardware 
deficiencies, Airforce had acknowledged that GEO -1 has performed better than expected 
during trial period and has demonstrated a sensor pointing accuracy “nine times more precise 
than required” and is capable of “detecting targets 25 percent dimmer than required with 60 
percent more accurate intensity measurement than specification”[Evans, 2013].  
GEO-1 was launched in 2011, GEO-2 in 2013, joined by GEO-3 which is undergoing testing 
(acoustic and thermal vacuum), GEO-4 is preparing for final assembly integration and 
testing, GEO -5 and GEO-6 will follow[Zacks, 2014]. 
Problems in Program level Initiatives  
DOD directives 5000 series were followed to reduce bureaucratic process and 
procedures[Jay A. Moody, 1997]. Although these promising system concepts were adopted 
in implementing the chosen architecture the architecture so adopted did prove to be a drastic 
failure[GAO, 2008]. The system analysis was rigorous to set the initial baseline for system 
performance requirements and KPP, the basic requirements of the mission were foregone to 
meet the schedule and cost. SAMP was the document which collated all aspects of the 
acquisition, this was not appropriate for the military context as more stringent measures were 
foregone and expressive nature of the various aspects of the program was eliminated for the 
sake of program’s success banner[Jay A. Moody, 1997]. 
Phase I Pre-EMD did not define the design concepts to the defined requirement as there were 
many changes in the engineering design as the program progressed which was ineffective at 
that stage of adoption[Jay A. Moody, 1997]. Each contractor team prepared systems 
requirements and systems functional requirements for the pre-EMD but the requirements 
were not properly defined as it resulted in formulating a high-level architecture which was 
to be overthrown for its own good[Jay A. Moody, 1997].  
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COEA was not effectively performed as the cost-effectiveness was derived from the 
performance analysis which was not performed on the grounds of achieving higher 
efficiency rather it was based on amicable solution among the Defense organizations[Jay A. 
Moody, 1997]. USAF requirement was to centralize the processing of satellite data whereas 
warfighters required the data to be provided directly to the theater combatant commands for 
processing, but the SPO decided to take a middle ground by centralizing the data processing 
in favor of warfighters which in the later phases proved difficult to achieve[Jay A. Moody, 
1997]. 
Cost as Independent Variable was developed to maximize the military utility for affordable 
KPP[Jay A. Moody, 1997], but the affordability ran out of the logical premise as there were 
many changes to the specifications in battery and power generation aspect of the design. The 
greatest success of SBIRS characteristics was contractor empowerment[Jay A. Moody, 
1997], enhanced communication, reduction in overhead, relaxed documentation and reduced 
government oversight, although they are considered as success factors, these were the causes 
of failure, as contractor empowerment led to improper assessment of technical efficiencies 
which led to cost estimation errors, reduction in overhead led to improper cost estimation as 
the personnel were not trained in the risk factor analysis, reduced government oversight led 
to improper coordination between the ground and flight team which together led to 
unplanned changes in design and many estimation errors in specific technical errors[Jay A. 
Moody, 1997]. Contractor Logistics support was considered to eliminate military personnel 
from maintaining SBIRS ground infrastructure which resulted in expensive coordination 
problems and in effect proved as a wrong decision from the government part to hand over 
the infrastructure to contractors[Jay A. Moody, 1997]. 
Problems in Requirements  
SBIRS had stable requirements from 1996 to 2005 [GAO, 2003]but the clarity of the 
requirements was in question at every stage of the life cycle[GAO, 2003]. This led to re-
requirement analysis for understanding the operational clarity. De-scope decisions and 
elimination of unnecessary requirements so deemed at that juncture had managed to prove 
wrong at the development phase as the workarounds were developed to postpone the 
inevitable[GAO, 2003]. The workarounds mounted up to a stage where it started its Pareto-
optimal tendencies resulting in redesign effort in 2007. 
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Problems in Architectural phase 
CRIMS  was developed for technical risk assessment process, but the technical risks were 
not assessed properly leading to unpredictability in the architecture, development, and test 
which led to cost overruns[Younossi et al., 2008]. Architecture of the flight software had 
drastic returns of this failure as the thermal vacuum test in 2003 [Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 2005]bore the cost of unpredictability as all telemetry data was lost at halt due to 
hardware design problems, in development the technologies were not mature enough to 
(TRL 6) to assess the predictability and in the test the architectural failures had impacted the 
predictability of what is to come from the development.  
The System Evaluation and Estimation of Resources (SEER) were followed to assess the 
software related technical risks which had similar problems of risk returns[Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 2005].  
An enabler of progress as stated by Dvorak[Dvorak, 2009], is the problem this project faced 
in making of flight software which had proven to be a complexity sponge as the design 
evolved with requirements clarity resulting in problems with quality attributes such as 
maintainability, testability, interoperability, scalability and flexibility increased multifold 
beyond repairable stage that in thermal vacuum testing(2007) the problems had increased to 
the mission failure consequences. As Dvorak advises, “larger percentage of the resource 
should be allocated to early analysis and architecture in order to avoid problems and rework 
later when it is more expensive to fix.” 
Core Flight Software System was developed by GSFC[Mccomas, 2012] and Mission Data 
System Architecture Platform was developed by JPL[Feller, Gluch, and Woodham, 2010] 
which in itself is a phenomenal architecture as it did give rise to unexpected performance 
results in flight software, but as the core flight software stands now is untouchable by their 
own developers. There seems to be a standing army guarding this core system. It is 
imperative to note that the core team does not trust others to be part of their honor. The 
developers were not allowed to change the interfaces and were given specific instructions to 
develop software based on the restrictive implementation policies. 
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Problems in Test phase 
The testing of ground segment and system testing was not developed in accordance with the 
military standards by SEIT [Jay A. Moody, 1997], as the test was not ready to accept the 
development inputs. The test team was still developing the test cases and test architecture 
was not taken into account before the beginning of the development[Jay A. Moody, 1997]. 
TEMP was not properly developed as it could not predict the technology risks undertaken 
by the development team[DOD, 2003]. One single Integrated T&E plan was developed for 
early validation of software maturity but the process was not utilized to the maximum ability 
as the test team lacked visibility into the development and risk analysis[DOD, 2003].  
Potential failure paths were tested such as Fault Detection, Diagnostics and Recovery 
(FDDR) for Flight software. Simulated realistic environment “Test as fly and fly as you test” 
was practiced to avoid failures[DOD, 2003] but the simulation tests had great failures due to 
workarounds implemented at every stage which mounted up to unavoidable stage[GAO, 
2003]. 
IHC issued interim Authority to operate accreditation after initial operational capability and 
provided 12 months to gain full accreditation which was inappropriately issued without 
proper investigation into the assurance capabilities[DOD, 2003]. 
As understood in this section there were many new initiatives introduced in SBIRS program, 
but they were not implemented properly leading to an inappropriate analysis of the progress 
of the program and workarounds were adopted to achieve the assigned goals which did lead 
to failures in the system. These failures in the process affected the architectural decisions 
which got to the stage of an accident that will be discussed in chapter three. 
The accident is the resultant of the program initiative failures, requirement failures, 
architectural design failures due to the inadequate clarity of requirements and testing failures 
due to inadequate development of flight software. As the software progressed through the 
life cycle, at every stage problems were encountered with workarounds. These workarounds 
accumulated to the stage of a major failure in thermal vacuum testing in 2007. This had 
caused a reassessment of the architecture. The resulting architecture was to solve the 
problems thus far by switching to a single core processor from the multicore processor. This 
adoption of architecture was the accident discussed in detail. 
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In the previous chapter, an analysis of methodology to be adapted to perform the accident 
analysis was discussed. This methodology has to highlight the flaws in the system and bring 
the actual facts of the accident to light. These methodologies have specific strengths in the 
analysis of the accident, so a thorough analysis of the accident analysis methodologies was 
undertaken to understand best-suited methodology to this accident scenario. In the next 
section how this accident methodology could be applied to the system context of the accident 
in the case study is discussed. 
2.2 Accident Analysis 
Accident analysis in the past has problems with the fast pace of technological change, 
changing nature of accidents, new types of hazards, decreasing tolerance to single accidents,  
increasing complexity and coupling,  more complex relationship between human and 
automation, changing regulatory and public views of safety[Leveson, 2004]. Accidents with 
social and organizational factors, system accidents and software errors, Human errors, 
change processes, holistic approach to the organization and their constraints are basic factors 
governing the accidents[Leveson, 2004]. 
STAMP advocates safety must be designed into the system, where development and 
operations safety has to be controlled using the feedback (measuring channel) and through 
downward information from hierarchy above (reference channel)[Leveson, 2004]. Feedback 
is critical to an open system in order to provide adaptive control[Leveson, 2004]. It is noticed 
that the change is a continuous process and the system adapts to the change. The change 
process exists in the labyrinth of the context. This context is a guide for equilibrium to be 
attained between the change and the adaptive processes. This context brings the link between 
the change processes and the adaption processes of the controls. Nancy Leveson’s theory of 
reference channel and measuring channel does influence the adaption process, but the 
context seems to have a disruptive influence on the controls. So it is recommended that 
context should also be studied for disruptions and prevention techniques should involve 
context as a factor in their solution. 
“For each of the factors, at any point in the control loop where a human or organization is 
involved, it will be necessary to evaluate the context in which decisions are made and the 
behavior-shaping mechanisms (influences) at play in order to understand how and why 
unsafe decisions have been made.” [Leveson, 2004] 
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Leveson's model identifies inadequate enforcement of safety constraints [Leveson, 2004] – 
inadequate control algorithm -  Nancy explains the context from the perspective of the 
control whereas there is an overall context which influences not just the control mechanism 
but the underlying constraints itself which is the most disruptive in course. This underlying 
context should also be considered as an enhancement over Nancy’s model of contextual 
control. – Inconsistent process model - Nancy explains the context form the perspective of 
the process, the enhancement over Nancy’s model would be to include the context which 
influences the sequence of the process which alters the elements in the sequence leading to 
disruption. – Inadequate coordination among decision makers and controllers - Nancy 
explains this as boundaries that are trespassed where the context focuses on the individual 
controller actions, the enhancement over Nancy’s model would be to include the high-level 
context which exists where the assignment of controls are decided. This will help the 
problem of the context which is set to fail right from the start as contradicting controls would 
be assigned causing disruption. – Inadequate Execution of control action - Nancy explains 
this as reference channel error, the enhancement over Nancy’s model would be to include 
the execution context as the context which is set for the controllers to behave in a disruptive 
manner whether the reference channel information is correct or wrong. - Inadequate or 
missing feedback - Nancy explains this as the measuring channel that should have a tap on 
the state of the context resulting out of the control execution, the enhancement over Nancy’s 
model would be to include the controller context as the context that is most disruptive is the 
controller itself. 
The control structures and control models incorporate the non-linear relationship reflecting 
the behavioral dynamics controlling the behavior of the entire technical and organizational 
structure over time in STAMP[Leveson, 2004]. This research has analyzed the STAMP 
model and enhanced the model to incorporate the context as a separate factor that has to be 
analyzed independently of the controllers and constraints. The context which formulates the 
labyrinth for the controllers and constraints to act as defined and adapt to the changes relies 
on this underlying context. In the above section system context was analyzed and in this 
section, accident context is derived from the above section for this case study. The STAMP 
model is enhanced to incorporate the underlying context to perform accident analysis of this 
case study in the next section. 
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For example, the software that does not know the plane is on the ground raises the landing 
gear.  Here the context is for the control actions which did not adapt to the change process 
thereby the context has a disruptive influence on the controller to execute such an action. 
Nancy’s model projects this as an inconsistent process model, which forces the process to 
erroneously behave by executing the wrong process[Leveson, 2004]. This context which 
Nancy explains is the execution context which would be the concrete cause, the context 
which is an enhancement over Nancy’s model is the controller context which is expected to 
have responded to the change process. Thus this research has enhanced the context further 
to incorporate the wider context to understand the STAMP accident model for its detailed 
structural understanding of the accident in this case study. 
SBIRS program had problems due to the introduction of new initiatives, cost overruns, 
military procedures were not followed, which led the program to the brink of failure. The 
program was delayed by 9 years due to many failures. The architecture which was originally 
in place was proven to be inadequate, the requirements were not followed, the documentation 
process was reduced, and various other military procedures were reduced to catch up with 
the program’s expectations. This is the wider context set for the accident discussed and this 
context is delved deep to understand the complexities that were influencing the context. 
The requirements were not defined appropriately which led the design to change frequently, 
requirements were defined without considering all organization’s requirements. Initiatives 
to determine the cost were not taken advantage of, the risk assessment categories were not 
identified properly which led to the cost estimation problems, the reduction in overhead led 
to improper co-ordination problems which led to technical errors and design problems. The 
requirement issues had been managed with workarounds and these workarounds mounted 
up to create a major failure in thermal vacuum testing in 2007 which mandated redesign. 
Technical risk assessments were not done properly which led to unpredictability in 
architecture.  The implemented software was barred from any changes and was restricted 
from developers.  Test architecture was not prepared due to unpredictability in architecture 
and test did not follow military standards. Assurance procedures were not followed leading 
to mistrust in the software development. 
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The original flight software design was to operate on two processors. The flight software 
underwent testing in thermal vacuum test and had major failures which led to redesign of 
flight software architecture to operate on a single processor. The accident is the architectural 
decision taken to operate flight software on the single processor rather than two processors. 
The inherent problem with this decision was that the flight software architecture would not 
take the advantage of the multicore processor and distributed application architecture. It is 
proven in this research that the wider context has a greater influence on the accident. So the 
wider context is studied to understand the complexities that influenced the architectural 
decision that this research has conducted accident analysis on. 
It is the influence of all the factors in the development life cycle of flight software that had 
led to this accident. These influences and the pressure mounted due to the program 
ineffectiveness which led to this accident. The program context that was detailed in the above 
section and the accident context that was detailed in this section will be analyzed in detail in 
chapter three.  The accident is analyzed using the best-suited method from the chapter one 
to identify the actual cause of the accident. The accident itself is detailed in chapter five 
explaining the reason for the architectural decision to be treated as an accident.  In chapter 
four accident prevention process is detailed. 
In the next section, STAMP accident methodology is adapted to the case study to understand 
the accident in the wider program context of the program which has influenced the accident 
to lead towards the major crisis where a wrong architectural decision was adopted which is 
the accident analyzed.  In the next chapter, the analysis of the case study is done by 
separating the program context and understanding the problems that influenced the accident 
and the accident that influenced the program as such. Initially, STAMP methodology is 
understood in detail and the process to follow in the case study to conduct STAMP accident 
analysis is understood. The context that had a greater influence on the accident is explained 
and finally STAMP accident analysis is conducted on the accident.
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Chapter III Systems Theoretic Accident Model and 
Processes 
Accidents cause are no more considered as simple due to the growing organizational 
complexity, they are the result of technological errors, human errors and also historical 
background and unfavorable organizational context[Qureshi, 2008]. An effective approach 
to develop an accident model for sociological organizations, the social and organizational 
causes of the accident is developing traction[Qureshi, 2008].  
High technology companies like aviation, maritime, air traffic control, telecommunications, 
nuclear power plants, defense and aerospace, chemical and petroleum industry, and 
healthcare and patient safety are complex systems leading to disastrous failures in loss of 
material and human life[Qureshi, 2008]. Most of the failures are the resultant of 
organizational factors and human operational factors in technical systems that are part of 
complex command and control environment. Modern technologies have a significant impact 
on nature of accidents and would require new causal analysis to understand and to develop 
prevention techniques[Qureshi, 2008].  
STAMP model considers technical, human and organizational factors in complex 
sociotechnical systems[Qureshi, 2008]. Thus accidents occur due to external disturbances or 
dysfunctional interaction among system components[Qureshi, 2008]. STAMP is based on 
the hierarchical model of the sociotechnical system[Qureshi, 2008]. A complex system is 
dynamic, as it is continually adapting to maintain stability and reacting to internal changes 
and to disturbances in its environment[Qureshi, 2008]. This system must project safe 
behavior and show adaptive behavior to cope with the changes[Qureshi, 2008]. 
Organizations in complex sociotechnical systems with systemic dependencies and tight 
coupling in the organizational structure and management policies could lead to 
organizational failures as contributory causal factors in system accidents[Qureshi, 2008]. 
Organizational context of technological systems is to be considered as it adds to complexity 
and susceptibility to the system accidents[Qureshi, 2008]. 
“Vaughn (1996) describes the Challenger accident as "social construction of reality" that 
allowed the banality of bureaucracy to create a habit of normalizing deviations from safe 
procedures.”[Qureshi, 2008] 
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It is essential to understand the role of politics and organizational power which would 
contribute to accident causation and disasters[Qureshi, 2008]. Resilience engineering is the 
ability of the organizations to anticipate the changing context to avoid accidents[Qureshi, 
2008]. Such system’s adaptations cannot be pre-programmed. Thus resilience engineering 
requires powerful methods, principles, and tools to prevent accidents[Qureshi, 2008]. 
Systemic accident model is an analytical side of resilience engineering and STAMP has been 
applied to this case study to analyze the resilience of the organizations confronted by high-
performance demands and high risk of accidents. 
3.1 STAMP 
STAMP is a system theory which analyses process flaws, system component interactions, 
organizational structures and engineering activities to understand the causes of the 
accident[Song, 2012]. This model focuses on the operational process of the system design 
and analysis where constraints, hierarchical levels of control and process models have 
control flaws leading to accidents. (Figure 14)[Leveson et al., 2003]. STAMP explains the 
processes involved in accidents by analyzing the process model designs where control flows 
are mapped to hierarchical levels of control to identify the control flaws and gaps in the 
constraints are analyzed to identify the interaction flaws to prevent accidents in future[Song, 
2012]. 
In system theory, systems are viewed as hierarchical structures where each level imposes 
constraints on the activity below it as the constraints are the interactions between control 
structures with details of behavioral structures that help in reaching the goal without 
failures[Leveson, 2004]. The hierarchical controllers impose these constraints on the 
interaction context. Figure 12 shows a generic socio-technical control model with system 
development and system operation as basic hierarchical control structures and interactions 
between them[Leveson, 2004]. Between the control structures, interactions are controlled by 
the information from the controller to enforce the constraints[Leveson, 2004]. Figure 14 
depicts an example of controllers and their interaction between them which has been mapped 
to the hierarchical levels of the organization[Leveson, 2004]. 
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Figure 14 STAMP Model [Leveson, 2011] 
STAMP describes the accidents as elements in the process acting on the next stage of the 
process with lack of explicit boundaries and overlapping of authorities between various 
stages, which generates conflict of interest on the information flow encouraging lack of 
confidence in the execution of the flow of control leading to accidents when seen as a whole 
process[Song, 2012].  
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This model details the intrinsic flaws in the system which hinders in achieving the goal 
smoothly. An accident here is therefore not just loss of life or property but the deviation in 
the regulated expectations[Song, 2012]. Thus this research on SBIRS will show the 
importance of deviation in the expectations during the natural course of continuous process 
improvement. And the constraints that were imposed on integrating different systems which 
were dependent on each other for goal achievement. In SBIRS, the systems development 
and systems operational levels will be detailed in order to understand the deviations which 
accumulated to build into an accident situation.  
The communication between the hierarchical levels are governed by controls as shown in 
Figure 15 which constraints the behavior of controls on next level of the hierarchy to avoid 
accidents[Leveson et al., 2003]. The continuous feedback mechanism improves the process 
and maintains the process in a dynamic equilibrium. This model is an important concept in 
STAMP which explains the framework of the process in order to understand the status of 
the controlled process so that the controller can amend the constraints to have a better 
understanding of effects on behavior to derive the goal[Leveson et al., 2003]. This model 
will be enhanced to accommodate other factors that influence the interaction model of 
STAMP core principles after learning from the SBIRS accident implementation in order to 
make the model preventive. 
 
Figure 15 STAMP core principles 
STAMP is a model which shows the interaction among the system components with 
inadequate enforcement of controls or constraints as the cause of the accident. Thus in 
essence component failures are attributed by the external or internal disturbances resulting 
in dysfunctional interactions among systems when not handled appropriately by the control 
system results in an accident[Leveson, 2011].  
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In SBIRS program various constraints were deviated to speed up the process, the state of 
behavior was not monitored properly and continuous improvements were adapted 
simultaneously which resulted in excessive cost and schedule overruns. The architecture of 
flight software was influenced by the ongoing process of improvement and the architecture 
had to bear the consequences which resulted in the adoption of the architecture with single 
core processor, which is the accident that will be discussed in the following sections. 
STPA is a process to conduct accident analysis in a systematic procedure. STPA follows 
STAMP as a methodology to understand the accident by decoupling the processes involved 
and understanding the deviations in the control structures and then assimilating every 
component to understand the influence of one another on the entire picture of the accident. 
The next part of the section will detail the STPA process to conduct STAMP analysis. 
3.2 STAMP based Process Analysis (STPA) 
STPA is based on the STAMP, where the whole process is viewed as small components and 
the collection of those components are analyzed together to formulate an opinion on control 
outcomes to moderate the behavior in order to understand the continuous improvement 
procedures for effective outcome[Song, 2012]. 
An accident is a loss of control in the process resulting in process splits leading to 
miscommunication between the processes which result in unwarranted outcomes[Song, 
2012]. After the control failures are identified, constraints are enforced to minimize the 
system failures. 
For E.g. 
 Accident: SBIRS project adopted wrong architecture in 2007 as a resultant of many 
workarounds built over time. As a result, it was delivered with $7.8 billion over estimated 
cost with schedule delays. 
Safety Constraint: Software architecture should be designed well in advance to required 
completion level in order to avoid such cost overruns. The architecture was only 50% 
complete when development started. 
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After identifying the constraint failures the process in the hierarchical control structures 
should be defined with detailed control outcomes in response to constraints. The general 
socio-technical model is described in Figure 14 where the downward lines show the control 
action and upward show the feedback which provides the effectivity of the constraints to the 
controllers of the system[Leveson et al., 2003].  
The next stage is to identify the inadequate controls which would lead the system to the 
accident. Thus an accident is a state where the constraints are violated that were already 
defined in the system. The migration of the constraints is undertaken to prevent accidents. 
The control flaws are classified as (Figure 16): 
 
Figure 16 Classification of control flaws leading to accidents [Leveson, 2011] 
1. Control input or external information is wrong or missing: control information 
provided by the controller to controlled process could be missing or wrong. 
2. Inadequate control algorithm: The control information may be inadequate or due to 
changes in the system, the information may not be appropriate or the process may be 
inadequately formed at the beginning. 
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3. The process model and Sensor: The process model may be incorrect from the 
beginning or changes over time might have made it inconsistent or it might be 
corrupted due to the inadequate feedback mechanism. 
4. Actuators or controlled process:  The controller may not have adequate process 
control in place due to transmission failures or it may depend on the input from other 
system or the component failure. 
In addition to above-mentioned control flaws, there could be multiple controllers resulting 
in communication failures. Thus STPA is a systemic method used in accident analysis as it 
considers the system as a whole rather than as separate component failures[Song, 2012]. 
STPA methodology was followed in order to effectively conduct accident analysis of SBIRS 
program. STPA process was followed in the accident described in the next section.  
According to STPA methodology, the STAMP accident analysis is implemented in three 
stages. 
1. The control structures are identified: At this stage of the accident analysis process, all 
the control structures are identified, their functionalities are understood (systems 
development), and their operating boundaries are defined (systems operations) as 
defined in Figure 14. 
2. Changes in control structures are identified that led to the accident: The next stage is to 
identify interaction failures among the controllers. The controllers change continually in 
response to the outcome of the controller’s actions (constraints) are understood in 
accordance with classification criteria as described in Figure 16. This is considered as 
atomic equilibrium achieved between the controllers. This may not consider the whole 
picture of the organizational changes in other controllers. Those controllers that did not 
adopt or lost control were considered as inadequate to reach the organizational goal. 
They are identified as missing structures. 
3. Dynamic mapping of the changes which combined to form an accident: This stage is to 
understand how various changes in controllers had influenced collectively towards 
failure. As one team of the controllers in an organization might not know the difference 
their decisions make on other organization’s controllers. At this stage, a clear picture of 
the accident cause is understood to derive preventive measures. 
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The STAMP analysis which helps to identify the controllers and their interactions based on 
constraints and their responsive change in constraints to stabilize the continuous change is 
understood clearly as explained in Figure 15. STPA process helps to organize the 
identification process in stages to arrive at the failures in individual processes that lead to 
accident collectively.  The next section explains the situation that led to the accident in 
SBIRS. The accident is the adoption of the single-core processor for flight software 
architecture. 
3.3 SBIRS Architectural Accident 
Flight software controls GEO satellite mission-critical functions such as health, status, and 
safety like telemetry, thermal control, power management and fault detection activities, so 
they cannot be deferred and uploaded after launch[GAO, 2008]. The original flight software 
design was to operate on two of four computer processors onboard the satellite as shown in 
Figure 17[GAO, 2008]. The flight software failed in testing and redesign efforts were 
planned by simplifying the architecture and increasing the robustness of fault management 
system for revised cost and schedule[GAO, 2008]. Lockheed Martin conducted trade study 
and recommended simplified architecture with all applications to be placed in the single 
processor rather than distributed application as shown in Figure 18[GAO, 2008]. 
 
Figure 17 Flight Software Architecture[GAO, 2008] 
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Figure 18 Recommendations of flight software architecture[GAO, 2008] 
The accident was the decision taken by DOD and recommended by Lockheed Martin that 
all applications were to be placed in one single processor[GAO, 2008]. This accident will 
be analyzed thoroughly for the circumstance in which such a decision was taken. In this 
section, the STAMP accident analysis is undertaken on the program level to understand the 
circumstances leading to the accident.  
In 1996, Lockheed Martin started development of reusable flight software (multifunctional 
bus) and in 2004 SBIRS program adopted flight software for GEO satellite[GAO, 2008]. In 
2005 to 2006, Airforce and Lockheed Martin conducted detailed requirements review[GAO, 
2008]. In January 2007, flight software underwent thermal vacuum testing and major 
unexpected and unexplained failures were uncovered[GAO, 2008]. In April 2007, as the 
defects escalated in additional tests, Lockheed Martin notified DOD of the seriousness of 
the problem[GAO, 2008].  
In April 2007 to July 2007, Airforce and Lockheed Martin developed two options either to 
modify the existing software or redesign the software by simplifying the architecture. In 
September 2007 to December 2007, Airforce chose to redesign the software architecture and 
began detailed software redesign efforts with Lockheed Martin. Lockheed Martin undertook 
trade study and recommended options as shown in Figure 18. Lockheed Martin 
recommended a simplified architecture to place all applications on a single processor as it 
represents the best fit with the system design[GAO, 2008]. This design was to address 
problems in original design such as the timing of stored programs that failed during thermal 
vacuum tests and fault management system that would increase the robustness[GAO, 2008]. 
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In March 2008, incremental Design Review was conducted for Block 1, which was approved 
by the program review board for revised cost and schedule[GAO, 2008]. In April 2008, the 
design was reviewed by six independent review teams for Block 2 design in Systems 
Engineering & Incremental Design Review which authorized Airforce and Lockheed Martin 
to proceed with formal software coding under the new design[GAO, 2008]. 
The accident is the adoption of architecture to place all applications on single processor after 
the thermal vacuum test failure in 2007. This is an accident as the applications will lose the 
advantage of distributed application and the choice of the single-core processor over 
multicore processor is a wrong architecture that was implemented.  
This accident was due to the circumstances that forced such an adoption of architecture as a 
get away from the existing situation. These circumstances are detailed below to understand 
the influence of the factors that had forced such a decision. The problems in different 
organizations involved are discussed under which collectively provided an environment for 
the accident. 
Problems in Test  
The problems uncovered in thermal vacuum testing were not identified earlier, as test beds 
were developed in parallel had defects which proved difficult to distinguish between testbeds 
and flight software issues; oversubscription of testbeds and lack of simulation resources had 
led to high-risk areas such as timing of stored programs which were not tested for insufficient 
modelling and lack of robustness[GAO, 2008]. 
A review was conducted in September 2002 to June 2003 to evaluate development testing 
of flight software for two ground segments: Highly Elliptical Orbit Intersegment Telemetry, 
Tracking and Commanding; and Highly Elliptical Orbit Early-On-Orbit Test Mission 
Processing for completeness, adequacy of testing including planning, execution, and 
reporting, as a result, validation of security, penetration test of system security features for 
HEO were found to be incomplete, leading to HEO test data to be doubted and HEO 
capability to test, assess and support SBIRS was contested[DOD, 2003].  
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Problems in Development  
Ground software development efforts were delayed due to database problems and the total 
size of software equivalent lines of code which impacted the schedule in system test[GAO, 
2007]. In addition software, development and test efforts had integration and total 
performance problems due to combined SPA and Pointing Control Assembly hardware and 
software elements and faulty hardware and software design of HEO/GEO flight computers 
and problems with ‘halt’ anomalies of single board computer[Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 2005].  
HEO P/L Single Board Computers had problems, there were three occurrences of 
unexplained P/L anomaly in halt as all the P/L telemetry data was lost and P/L did not 
respond to commands in thermal vacuum testing of HEO 1 in 2003[Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, 2005]. As the telemetry data was lost no conclusions could be drawn and this 
problem repeated in second P/L thermal vacuum testing as well. GEO P/L configuration is 
different from HEO P/L and complex, latent defects were discovered in the manufacturing 
process of HEO in integration and test sequence leading to delays in the schedule[Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, 2005]. 
As SBIRS High had problems with sensor chip assembly development needed for sensor 
detector arrays and pointing control assembly software development and control gyro 
reference assembly also failed during life testing in Increment 1 and ground software 
problems resulted in two-year slip[GAO, 2003]. As HEO 1 was the first major deliverable 
for Increment 2, the sensor delivery was delayed by a year from February 2002 to February 
2003, further delay was due to first infrared sensor that had significant defects in flight 
software involving sensor’s ability to maintain earth coverage and track missiles while 
orbiting the earth in system test in November 2002 resulting in further postponements of 
delivery[GAO, 2003]. 
The first time integration of flight software was exercised in a new system, the proto-
qualification had to be tested using simulators or flight hardware so transition to facilitate 
the operational use had added complexity in integration and test for GEO 2 as flight software 
would be operationally used in development testing which led to remaining SBIRS program 
at risk[Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005].  
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SBIRS High had problems in development integration after restructuring and MR were 
depleting at a higher rate leading to cost and schedule variance[GAO, 2007]. GAO analysis 
reported challenges in assembly, integration and test before the re-baseline in February 2006 
and schedule delays and cost overruns leading to 28% of MR been spent from April 2006 to 
November 2006, thus to meet the cost and schedule goals, some needed capabilities were 
deferred[GAO, 2007].  
SBIRS High technology integration was a high risk due to insufficient time as by June 2003 
only 58 percent of GEO sensor integration, assembly, test and checkout work was completed 
with $2million of work were behind schedule[GAO, 2003]. Software development of the 
ground system efforts was behind schedule by 32 percent by November 2006[GAO, 2007].  
Problems in Design  
Major design changes occurred to GEO late in design phase due to technical problems found 
in testing, in 2000, the HEO flattener lens failed during first random vibration test and lens 
came out of its mounts due to design deficiencies, then the corrector lens failed in the second 
test in 2001, in addition, due to degraded sensor performance which if left unaddressed 
would lead to failure to meet KPP, which was resolved by adding 12 foot sunshade for off-
axis solar radiation rejection. HEO 1 had continuous changes to design due to SPO 
authorizing to pass the SBIRS High critical design review with just 50% of design drawing 
whereas the recommended completion was 90%, in addition, IRT report found that the 
program did not invest enough time and resources in the basic systems engineering analysis 
resulting in cost and schedule escalations[Younossi et al., 2008].  
Two late design changes were made to improve GEO satellites success, 80 amp battery was 
to be replaced with 100 amps battery to improve operational reliability with the estimate of 
$15 million but the cost performance report in June 2003 shows the contractor was having 
difficulty assessing the specifications of the battery resulting in schedule delays and 
increased cost. And the second change was to modify the solar cell panel to resolve power 
deficiency for which the impact on cost was not yet determined[GAO, 2003].  
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Problems in Program 
The SPO had limited ability to identify all technical risks due to lack of integrated 
management system as contractors had projected optimistic claims on work content 
completed resulting in inaccurate and unrealistic cost performance index and schedule 
performance index, up to date information was not available for thorough technical 
assessments and interrelationships among risks were not identified, and IBRs were not 
conducted regularly, on top of that SPO’s visibility was limited as consequence of TSPR1 
which removed the level of rigor in monitoring and assessing contractor capabilities, 
technical assessments were subjective consequently the inexperience of the staff had 
influenced, budget pressure, rushed environment and optimism about TSPR had influenced 
technical risk assessments[Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005]. HEO and GEO payload 
development had series of technical issues in 2002 but in 2002 IBR risks were rated moderate 
or lower, it is unclear why it was evaluated in a more optimistic light.  The contractor risk 
assessments were either incomplete or over-optimistic due to contractor’s own incentive to 
bias the technical assessments[Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005].  
TSPR approach had poor performance which was reacquired in 2002 to regain the ability to 
properly oversee and assess contractor performance by SPO[GAO, 2008]. COTS were 
assumed to be beneficial and hence deemed low risk without in-depth analysis as it was 
based on commercial bus, but GEO bus underwent significant configuration changes and 
weight growth due to unique military requirements consequently led to removal of military 
standards and specifications which in turn led to quality control issues that resulted in serious 
technical problems such as HEO EMI problem[Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005]. 
 
                                                        
1 TSPR – Contractor formulates technical design, implements solutions and relieved of cumbersome 
reporting requirements with minimal government oversight. 
 
Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Processes | SBIRS Architectural Accident 
Sujatha Mohanram Post Graduate Research 56 
Contractor oversight was not appropriately managed which led to lack of disciplined 
approach to software development resulting in inadequate coordination between cost and 
schedule functions[GAO, 2008]. Further to meet the cost and schedule goals, waivers were 
granted by software engineering process group to software development process which 
increased the program risks[GAO, 2008]. Waivers were approved for software design to be 
done in parallel with software specification activity, which led to certain requirements been 
rejected and resulting in rework in design and coding. Another waiver was authorized for 
software unit integration testing to be done in parallel with formal unit testing, as a result, 
formal unit testing found problems that were not found in development unit testing resulting 
in rework[GAO, 2008].  
SBIRS High maintained insufficient memory margin of the onboard satellite of 35% as 
against 50 % required and waivers were granted for this effect[GAO, 2003]. Thus SBIRS 
program had continued technical complexity challenges leading to flight software failure in 
thermal vacuum testing in spite of more than 12 years of its inception which had resulted in 
cost overruns[GAO, 2008]. There were problems with acquisition policies governing basic 
system design which led to latent defect and process escapes in AI&T activities resulting in 
cost and schedule delays due to rework in GEO[Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005]. 
Technical risk assessments were underestimated due to immature technologies, compressed 
testing schedules which led to technical difficulties that eventually resulted in failures in 
meeting technical performance which in turn led to redesigns and reworks leading to 
schedule slips and cost growths[Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005]. In 1996 risk 
assessment, all other risks were mitigated except HEO software development activities 
continued as a risk in GEO integration and test and in 1999 risk assessment, again flight 
software did not receive much attention and was found to be unexpectedly difficult in HEO 
integration. In 2004, technical risks related to flight and ground software related to first-time 
integration efforts were found to be of high risk[Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005].  
In addition DCMA reported variance at completion at $25.6 million and schedule variance 
of 32% whereas threshold variance was 5% due to integration testing and operations, thermal 
vacuum test preparation and engineering rework such as Pointing and Control Assembly 
software was restructured to allow off-ramp option whereas flight software could not be off-
ramped as they are needed for launch, tracking algorithms and software were not complete 
with hundreds of open defects and delayed qualifications[GAO, 2007].  
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In addition lack of coordination between ground software development and space due to late 
delivery of database and inability of program office to reduce the length of time taken to 
certify data processed from GEO1 resulted in accelerated ground software development. In 
addition integration of GEO flight software which was high-risk effort did not start until 
August 2003 as scheduled[GAO, 2007]. 
There were 148 defective EMI frequencies, which would lead to mission failure, of which 
39 design modifications were made and 7 were granted waivers as it would not cause 
performance problems. There were process failures, stringent requirements and the 
subcontractor did not implement the EMI control plan which was agreed in EMI design 
review and further no contractor was clearly responsible for integrating HEO sensor with 
the host bus[GAO, 2003]. Further due to signal weaknesses in HEO sensor, which had 
delayed and increased the risk. SBIRS continued to experience technical issues in GEO 
signal processing software development and HEO-2 payload software qualification testing 
after HEO sensor delivery[GAO, 2003]. 
Hardware installation at the remote ground station, legacy reporting system interfacing with 
MCS, delays to start testing, the requirement of testing of parallel operations prior to the 
declaration of IOC, fault detection, and isolation problems led to a significant delay in 
performance and reliability test. And HEO message certification milestone schedule had 
delayed from November 2004[DOD, 2003]. 
Compressed timeline, issues due to shared facilities at overseas relay ground stations, delay 
in performance validation testing of increment 1 ground software, inadequate testbed design 
and scope, simulation tests needed, accelerated deployment of low component in 2004, 
significant improvement in SBIRS High requirements over DSP and inadequate HWIL 
testbeds in OT&E has resulted in increased risk and schedule delays and cost overruns[DOD, 
2003]. 
The decline in the defense budget, consolidation of the aerospace industry and growing 
competition for the fewer programs, resulting in increased cost efficiency by transferring 
program responsibilities to contractors with less government oversight[Younossi et al., 
2008]. The acquisition reform measures eliminated usual cost and technical risk assessment 
data recording, increased technological complexity and reduced acquisition workforce due 
to downsizing challenged the knowledge to assess the technical and system engineering 
progress of the program[Younossi et al., 2008].  
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In addition the program office did not implement Airforce instruction 99-101 
“Developmental Test and Evaluation” also SMM tool was not used to track the progress of 
the program and all critical test plans and reports were not signed off, thus without effective 
management and oversight of development and testing, the program had the risk of repeating 
the problems identified during the program recertification[DOD, 2003]. 
The SBIRS program had a major failure in thermal vacuum testing in 2007, which was the 
consequence of the problems found in testing, development, design, and program. The 
thermal vacuum test failure was not detected earlier as testing was not performed adequately, 
the initiatives which were introduced did not allow thorough testing to be performed. The 
development problems were mostly due to new technologies and integration problems. The 
thermal vacuum testing problem in 2003 was not clarified when the same problem repeated 
in 2007 with additional problems due to workarounds done to cover up the minor problems 
mounted to an unmanageable extent. The development did have problems in design issues 
where they had to make up with workarounds to cover up the design issues. The design 
problems were handled in development and were caught in the test. Thus the development 
did bear the problems from the design and test. The program initiatives were not giving 
fruitful results, the problems with contractor oversight, waivers were granted, the disciplined 
approach was not adopted, the design was not completed before starting the development, 
pressured by the political situation of the program to finish were the major factors that had 
an influence on the program. 
The scene of SBIRS program was set with many problems from various departments. These 
problems (mentioned above) were derived from System Analysis done in Chapter II SBIRS 
program Analysis.  The program underwent changes from controllers of other organizations 
and within to incorporate the continuous change by molding the constraints to establish a 
temporary equilibrium. In doing so, many of the organizations did not cope well to achieve 
the goal.  
These above-mentioned failures had resulted in the loss of resources, money and time. 
Accidents should be analyzed from the point of failure in achieving efficiency, not just the 
end result of the project.  
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Although the SBIRS program did manage to complete the project successfully, it had major 
failures to learn from the cost overruns, program delays and initiatives introduced in the 
processes. This time it just caught up with the thermal vacuum test in 2007 which forced an 
action, this architectural decision was a wrong decision taken which would further degrade 
the development.  
As the problems were identified from different organizations (above mentioned), the next 
stage in accident analysis process is to identify the controllers, functionalities, and 
constraints they have control over. How these above-mentioned changes had brought forth 
equilibrium among the interacting controllers will be analyzed in the next section. 
3.4 STAMP analysis of SBIRS Architectural Accident 
SBIRS program had major defects that mounted up to the mission-critical problem in thermal 
vacuum test which resulted in $7.8 billion cost overrun and schedule delays of 9 years. An 
accident analysis is performed to understand the causes of the accident and to learn lessons 
from it[Younossi et al., 2008]. STAMP analysis is conducted to identify the flaws in decision 
processes and control flaws that led to the accident. 
SBIRS program sets the stage for larger context over the years for decision failures overtime 
which mounted up to be a major problem. The decisions so taken at that juncture were not 
noticeably failure control factors, but over time as the process evolved, even the slight 
deviation formulated a major failure. This evolution of failure control factors could be in 
different parts of the system that will not know how it will affect the other parts of the system. 
This could even be a result of just one part of the system that had degraded resulting in a 
domino effect. 
The first step in creating STAMP analysis is to identify system failures (identified in the 
previous section) and system constraints. Each part of the process will have system 
constraints, these safety constraints will have to be adequately designed for the overall 
system to be effective. This research has taken the additional step of identifying the overall 
context and how it influences the accident context in the previous section. 
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The accident is shown in two phases, one as a static snapshot of control structure over time 
for many such snapshots to formulate series of control structures which does not show 
dynamic nature of the accidents. The next phase is to depict the dynamic nature of the model 
showing the relationship between control structures and resulting failure events. The final 
model summarizes the other models and depicts the accident causes evidently by showing 
for each control structure, its decisions, and control factors that led to an accident so that 
preventive measures could be recommended.  
3.4.1 SBIRS Control Structures 
The architectural accident of SBIRS flight software is discussed in detail, the decision of 
placing flight software in the single processor after the redesign is analyzed for changes in a 
control structure that led to accident situation. A complete analysis of the program had to be 
done while considering circumstances in which this decision was taken. The safety control 
structure should not have decided to place the flight software component in one processor: 
 As single-core processor has lower performance, is less efficient, has lower fail-safe 
and produces more heat.[Ghuman, 2016] 
 Application on single core processor is difficult to maintain an application grows in 
size increasing complexity.[Fielding, 2000]  
 DOD should not have authorized the design with single core processor. 
The Figure 19 shows the control structures identified. As the decision was to adopt single 
core processor and to place all applications in single core processor, there are many problems 
related to such a decision. The single core processor has a lower fail-safe mechanism and 
produces more heat. The original design was to have a multicore processor, which is a good 
architectural decision. The applications on non-distributed application architecture would 
over time grow in complexity and would be difficult to maintain. Thus the accident is an 
architectural decision taken without considering these drawbacks. There should have been 
safety constraints to monitor the architectural decisions.  These constraints should have been 
enforced by DOD in the entire control structure.  
GAO is responsible for auditing, evaluation, and recommendation of options to the federal 
government to make an informed decision. GAO chose to opt for redesign option so 
presented after the trade study with single core processor. It is the responsibility of DOD to 
ensure the constraints are in place to effectively design flight software architecture for 
efficiently performing software. DOD did not have a proper mechanism to evaluate the 
redesign options presented by Lockheed Martin. 
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The control structures are identified in Figure 19 and their functionalities and constraints are 
analyzed to identify the failures in response to the change (inference explained in italics). 
Controllers like DOD, GAO, and constraints such as waivers are identified and depicted in 
Figure 19 and explained below. 
Figure 19, explains the relationship between each controller and identifies the failures in 
interactions. The controller Lockheed Martin which identified major issues of “flight 
software problems” notified the DOD of its concerns. As GAO is an auditing body, the GAO 
conducted “performance audit to provide sufficient evidence” of the situation with Airforce, 
Lockheed Martin, Defense contract management agency and forwarded its 
recommendations as “assessment of flight software problem” to DOD. The Airforce 
“recommended the redesign” to DOD. The Program review board “approved the redesign” 
after reviewing the redesign to DOD.  Independent review team comprising of Aerospace 
Corporation; Lockheed Martin and Under Secretary of Defense “authorized to develop on 
redesign” to DOD. The Joint Execution team comprising of Airforce, Lockheed Martin and 
Aerospace Corporation “authorized to develop on redesign” to DOD. Defense contract 
management agency had submitted “program assessment report” to SPO. USSPACECOM 
which was responsible for “requirement issue” reported to DOD. Inspector General of DOD 
was responsible for test operations “reviewed software testing” on Lockheed Martin, 
Airforce and Northrop Grumman and reported to DOD. Designated approval authority 
approved “interim authority to operate HEO capability” to SPO. Department of Defense 
Information Security Certification Authority reported “security validation”   problems to 
DOD. System engineering and integration team “maintains traceability of HEO 
requirements in test” reported to DOD. Integrated product team, “maintains traceability of 
ground requirements in test” reported to DOD. The Air Force Operational Test and 
Evaluation Center reported “operational testing” report to DOD. Space technical interchange 
had the responsibility of “flight software test plan” reported to DOD. Failure review board 
maintained “anomaly management documentation” for DOD. SPO conducted “risk 
assessment” and reported to DOD. DOD authorized “waivers” to SPO. Software engineering 
process group requested waivers to DOD. 
The detailed controllers and their interactions with other controllers are explained below 
under each controller identified in Figure 19. The first stage of STAMP analysis is to identify 
control structures responsible for the accident.
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Figure 19  STAMP SBIRS Control Structures
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Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor responsible for the development of flight 
software. Since Lockheed Martin was having a major failure in thermal vacuum testing 
and the defects were growing to an uncontrollable extent, Lockheed Martin proposed an 
easy solution to solve the problems. The solution was to redesign the architecture with 
single core processor and to place all applications in the single processor. Lockheed 
Martin did not evaluate the consequences of such a design option. 
Government Accountability Office conducted audit in Office of the secretary of state, 
Airforce, Lockheed Martin and Defense Contract Management Agency to provide 
sufficient evidence of the problem. GAO did have oversight responsibility on Lockheed 
Martin during the trade study, still, GAO recommended this option of redesign to 
DOD[GAO, 2008]. GAO did not have proper oversight on the contractor’s situation and 
had taken Lockheed Martin’s proposed option to be apt. 
Airforce was working with the contractor in the redesign effort and had visibility of 
requirements of the user community. Airforce undertook requirements re-clarification 
effort along with the Lockheed Martin just before the redesign effort, still, Airforce 
recommended this redesign option[GAO, 2008]. Airforce’s basis to recommend this 
redesign option is not clear. 
Program review board has the responsibility of assessing the architecture to the 
suitability of military requirements and recommends the design option after the review 
of the program members[GAO, 2008]. It is due to the negligence on the part of the review 
team to have recommended the redesign option so presented by Lockheed Martin. 
Independent Review Team comprising of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics; Aerospace Corporation; Lockheed Martin; Airforce Space 
and Missiles System Center Wing; and Software Engineering Institute was responsible 
to give an independent assessment of design, as this redesign effort is followed by major 
failure in thermal vacuum testing due to design problems[GAO, 2008]. Independent 
Review Team did not do a rigorous analysis of the design presented for a redesign due 
to oversight of the future performance problems this design would arise.  
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Joint Execution Team is a joint effort by Airforce, Lockheed Martin and Aerospace 
Corporation have the responsibility of flight software development of GEO1 efforts and 
to conduct inch stone review, Executive Program management and to address 
weaknesses including Independent Program Assessment recommendations on technical 
baselines[GAO, 2008]. The IPA finding reported on lack of disciplined process of 
Lockheed Martin and Airforce had limited control on SBIRS program and recommended 
separate program manager for flight software team[GAO, 2008]. This team was formed 
after the DOD authorized to proceed with development based on the redesign, it should 
be noted that the members were already players in the program. This effort was initiated 
by DOD to mitigate problems related to the original design of flight software. It is indeed 
noted that this new combination did not help improve the situation in GEO1 flight 
software architecture as the development proceeded after the redesign based on the 
flawed architecture. 
Defense Contract Management Agency has the responsibility of monitoring the 
progress of software development of GEO in Lockheed Martin as any delays would 
affect the launch[GAO, 2008]. HEO software development was delayed due to an 
aggressive schedule and lack of understanding of the complexity of software tasks 
resulting in higher defects. Flight software sensor ability to maintain earth coverage and 
track missile while orbiting the earth had several defects in testing and HEO software 
development is among top ten program risks[Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005]. 
In addition, flight software development was significantly behind schedule (32%) and 
rework due to a higher amount of growing defects. Software development and 
integration, testing and assembly had problems including a sensor, pointing, and control 
assembly[Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005]. In effect, DCMA did not have a close 
monitor on the development schedule and the progress on Lockheed Martin resulting in 
unexpected outcomes. 
Inspector General of Department Of Defense has the responsibility of reviewing 
software testing and Quality Integrity Accountability testing in development in Lockheed 
Martin, Airforce and Northrop Grumman[DOD, 2003]. Validation of system security 
features in Interim HEO capability found that the accreditation process was 
incomplete[DOD, 2003]. Thus the data which were tested in HEO capability could not 
be trusted and the facility to perform tests were also questionable. 
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USSPACECOM produces SBIRS CONOPS, SBIRS ORD, JROC validated MNS, 
SBIRS CRD, and SBIRS ORD. JROC also focused on survivability and data availability 
for Pre-EMD. Along with SWF and Air Force Requirements Oversight Council served 
to resolve operational requirements issues[Jay A. Moody, 1997]. The survivability 
requirement is regarding maintaining nuclear survivability during the cold war and data 
availability is regarding providing unprocessed data to the warfighter in theater 
combatant commands for processing[Jay A. Moody, 1997]. Although the requirements 
were well captured, the clarity of certain operational details required was not detailed 
well. So the requirement in the form of clarity kept improving which brought unplanned 
changes in development which led to increased complexity leading to growing defects. 
Designated Approval Authority is responsible for certifying the security test and 
evaluation and penetration test, to accredit, withhold or issue Interim Authority to 
Operate. Designated Approval authority had inappropriately issued Interim Authority to 
Operate to Interim Highly Elliptical Orbit Capability (IHC) and this is planned to 
continue till 2010[DOD, 2003]. This violated Department of Defense Information 
Security Certification Authority by not ensuring the system security features were met 
by conducting security tests. And to allow IHC to operate incorrectly issued Interim 
Authority to operate annually, System Security Authorization Agreement was violated. 
Thus the IHC data is considered incorrect as system security features such as 
availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality were not validated against.  
System Engineering Integration Team maintains HEO specification to ground 
segment requirement using Modified Design Compliance Matrix which is a requirement 
verification Ledger which is used in testing[DOD, 2003]. The ground segment 
Integrated Product Team maintains software requirements specification of the ground 
segment which uses Requirement Traceability and Management tool for test verification. 
These testing results are analyzed to proceed to integration and system testing[DOD, 
2003]. The system engineering integration team did not validate the tests properly to 
proceed to system test as the code reached the thermal vacuum testing and had major 
failures. 
Space technical interchange, a testing plan was recommended for space vehicle testing 
including for flight software[GAO, 2008]. DOD conducted the space technical 
interchange meeting to improve on the testing capabilities after the redesign effort was 
approved.  
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The Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) has the 
responsibility of performing Operational Utility Evaluation of SBIRS. Testing of ground 
architecture, GEO 1, two hosted infrared payloads in HEO and legacy Defense Support 
Program assets[Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005]. Joint Interoperability Test 
Center, OSD, and SPO were brought together with AFOTEC to work as a team and 
formulate a unified development test and evaluation and operational test and evaluation 
to formulate a single test and evaluation plan. AFOTEC also ensures the acquisition 
strategy is maintained throughout the acquisition cycle by validating the operational 
effectiveness and checks the suitability of system in a cost-effective manner[DOD, 
2003]. Although test had unified approach to development and operational test, the 
testing was not performed effectively to avoid major failure in thermal vacuum testing. 
Failure Review Board has the responsibility of analyzing the failures and ensuring a 
mitigation plan for the assessed functionality[Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005]. 
The failure review board had assessed some functionalities as risky, the mitigation plans 
did not work leading to the risks carried further into later stages of the development 
cycle. This led the risks to be escalated as bigger to the stage of failure. 
SBIRS Program Office has the responsibility of running the program smoothly to the 
effective delivery. The program office had brought many new initiatives to have the feel 
of success, unfortunately, there were many failures leading to major failure in the 
delivery of flight software in thermal vacuum testing.  
Waivers were requested by Lockheed Martin in software development process to bypass 
the regular process to software engineering process group which was granted by SPO 
leading to failures in development process[GAO, 2008]. Two major failures were noted 
due to waivers, waivers were granted for design to be done in parallel with specification 
activities and waivers were granted for development testing to be in parallel with formal 
unit testing. These waivers evidently led to problems in design as there were many design 
changes resulting from requirement specification clarification activity. And there were 
mounting defects in the formal unit testing due to the code not been tested in development 
testing resulting in heavy rework. 
The next stage in STAMP analysis to identify the changes in control structure leading to 
the accident. 
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3.4.2 Changes in Control structure leading up to the Accident 
SBIRS program structure started with control problems, over time many new initiatives 
were brought in to mitigate the control problems, but the problems multiplied with 
program’s progress. There were many deviations in the process to attain the success of 
new initiatives. Thus small changes in the process or the initiatives could lead to failure. 
The failures of the individual controllers from the previous section (3.4.1) are collated 
based on the functionalities that affected the constraints in response to the changes. The 
failures are classified based on classification categories (see Figure 16) as specified in 
STAMP (inferred in italics) below.  As a result, STAMP helps in identifying the 
controllers that did not adequately respond to the changes which resulted in an accident.  
The controllers are analyzed for every interaction between them and interaction failures 
are identified and categorized based on STAMP to reveal the flawed controllers depicted 
(in dotted lines) in Figure 20.  
SBIRS Program Office 
SBIRS program office has implemented all the initiatives as suggested by DOD and has 
achieved a certain level of submissive acceptance of DOD’s procedural compression of 
enthusiasm to successfully complete the program. It is evident from below mentioned 
evolution of attitude by training obedience to follow the set path of DOD. 
DCMA reported variance at completion at $25.6 million and schedule variance of 32% 
whereas threshold variance was 5% due to the integration testing and operations, thermal 
vacuum test preparation and engineering rework such as Pointing and Control Assembly 
software was restructured to allow off-ramp option whereas flight software could not be 
off-ramped as they are needed for launch, tracking algorithms and software were not 
complete and hundreds of open defects and delayed qualifications[GAO, 2007].  
In addition lack of coordination between ground software development and space due to 
late delivery of database and inability of program office to reduce the length of time taken 
to certify data processed from GEO1 resulted in accelerated ground software 
development. In addition integration of GEO flight software which was high-risk effort 
did not start until August 2003 as scheduled[GAO, 2007]. (Missing control structure). 
This is because the assumption of estimation did not include clarity of the basis for 
assessment which led to unpredictable outcomes. 
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TSPR approach had poor performance which was reacquired in 2002 to regain the ability 
to properly oversee and assess contractor performance by SPO[GAO, 2008]. COTS were 
assumed to be beneficial and hence deemed low risk without in-depth analysis as it was 
based on commercial bus, but GEO bus underwent significant configuration changes and 
weight growth due to unique military requirement consequently led to removal of 
military standards and specifications which in turn led to quality control issues that 
resulted in serious technical problems such as HEO EMI problem[Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, 2005]. (Inadequate control enforcement). This is because of negligence in 
assessing the requirements. 
The SPO had limited ability to identify all technical risks due to lack of integrated 
management system as contractors had projected optimistic claims on work content 
completed resulting in inaccurate and unrealistic cost performance index and schedule 
performance index, up to date information was not available for thorough technical 
assessments and interrelationships among risks were not identified, and IBRs were not 
conducted regularly, on top of that SPO’s visibility was limited as consequence of TSPR 
(TSPR – Contractor formulates technical design, implements solutions and relieved of 
cumbersome reporting requirements with minimal government oversight.) ( which 
removed the level of rigor in monitoring and assessing contractor capabilities.[Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, 2005](Inadequate control structure). This is because of 
inadequate information about the progress in many systems. 
Technical assessments were subjective consequently the inexperience of the staff had 
influenced, budget pressure, rushed environment and optimism about TSPR had 
influenced technical risk assessments. HEO and GEO payload development had series 
of technical issues in 2002 but in 2002 IBR risks were rated moderate or lower, it is 
unclear why it was evaluated in a more optimistic light.  The contractor risk assessments 
were either incomplete or over-optimistic due to contractor’s own incentive to bias the 
technical assessments[Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005]. (Inadequate control 
structure). This is because although technical risks were identified the level of risks were 
inappropriate, they were not mitigated before the beginning of the development which 
led to failures. 
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Technical risks assessments were underestimated due to immature technologies, 
compressed testing schedules which led to technical difficulties that eventually resulted 
in failures in meeting technical performance which in turn led to redesigns and reworks 
leading to schedule slips and cost growths[Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
2005].(Asynchronous evolution). This is because of the complexity of the technology. 
In 1996 risk assessment, all other risks were mitigated except HEO software 
development activities continued as the risk in GEO integration and test and in 1999 risk 
assessment, again flight software did not receive much attention and was found to be 
unexpectedly difficult in HEO integration. In 2004, technical risks of flight and ground 
software related to first-time integration efforts were found to be of high risk[Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, 2005]. (Inadequate control structure). This is because the 
barriers to proceed were not defined. 
Contractor oversight was not appropriately managed which led to lack of disciplined 
approach to software development resulting in inadequate coordination between cost and 
schedule functions. Further to meet the cost and schedule goals, waivers were granted by 
Software Engineering Process Group to software development process which 
increased the program risks[GAO, 2008]. (Asynchronous evolution). This is because of 
negligence to adhere to the process leading to problems in assessment processes. 
SBIRS High had problems in development integration after restructuring and MR were 
depleting at a higher rate leading to cost and schedule variance. GAO analysis reported 
challenges in assembly, integration and test before the re-baseline in February 2006 and 
schedule delays and cost overruns leading to 28% of MR been spent from April 2006 to 
November 2006, thus to meet the cost and schedule goals, some needed capabilities were 
deferred[GAO, 2007]. (Inadequate control structure). This is because the progress of 
the process had many failures in the delivery mechanism. 
Waivers were approved for software design to be done in parallel with software 
specification activity, which led to certain requirements been rejected and rework in 
design and coding.  Another waiver was authorized for software development unit testing 
to be done in parallel with formal unit testing, as a result, formal unit testing found 
problems that were not found in development unit testing resulting in rework[GAO, 
2008]. SBIRS High maintained insufficient memory margin of the onboard satellite of 
35% as against 50 % required and waivers were granted for this effect.  
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Thus SBIRS program had continued technical complexity challenges leading to flight 
software failure in thermal vacuum testing in spite of more than 12 years of its inception 
which had resulted in cost overruns[GAO, 2008]. There were problems with acquisition 
policies governing basic system design which led to latent defects and process escapes 
in Assembly &Integration Testing activities resulting in cost and schedule delays due to 
rework in GEO[GAO, 2008]. (Inadequate control enforcement). This is because of the 
lack of understanding of the extent to which change will cause to the mission goal. 
SPO had performed diligently by following DOD in keeping pace with its directions. 
SPO had conducted technical assessments but was not able to assess the effects of minor 
deviations resulting in the projection of compliance to the cohesive environment of DOD. 
TSPR being a flagship initiative of DOD, did not allow appropriate oversight leading to 
in- appropriation built in which is later expressed as inertia. Waivers were granted by 
DOD to bypass some of the norms which led SPO to be submissive in compliance of 
DOD’s procedures. 
AIRFORCE 
Hardware installation at the remote ground station, legacy reporting system interfacing 
with MCS, delays to start testing, the requirement to test parallel operations prior to the 
declaration of IOC, fault detection and isolation problems led to a significant delay in 
performance and reliability test. And HEO message certification milestone schedule had 
delayed from November 2004[DOD, 2003]. (Inadequate control enforcement). This is 
because of the lack of motivation to improve the efficiency of the process performance. 
Airforce did not enforce compliance at different phases of the development, test 
processes which had led to a relaxation of grip over the contractors. So the contractors 
had responded to this attitude by keeping Airforce in dark.  
LOCKHEED MARTIN 
Lockheed Martin is the major contractor. Lockheed Martin did comply with the DOD’s 
norms, by following on DOD’s path. Thereby accepting the deviations recommended by 
the DOD which resulted in delays and failures in the test. This is projected as the 
systematic building of inertia by curtailing their will to comply with a disciplined 
approach. 
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HEO 1 had continuous changes to design due to SPO authorizing to pass the SBIRS High 
critical design review with just 50% of design drawing whereas the recommended 
completion was 90%, in addition, IRT report found that program did not invest enough 
time and resources in basic systems engineering analysis resulting in cost and schedule 
escalations[Younossi et al., 2008].(Inadequate control enforcement). This is because it 
gave room for inappropriate creeps due to inadequate enforcement of recommendations 
Major design changes occurred to GEO late in design phase due to technical problems 
found in testing, in 2000, the HEO flattener lens failed during the first random vibration 
test and the lens came out of its mounts due to design deficiencies, then the corrector lens 
failed in the second test in 2001, in addition, due to degraded sensor performance which 
if left unaddressed would lead to failure to meet KPP, which was resolved by adding 12 
foot sunshade for off-axis solar radiation rejection[Younossi et al., 2008].(Inadequate 
control enforcement). This is because of the failure that was repeated showing the 
inadequate enforcement. 
As HEO 1 was the first major deliverable for Increment 2, the sensor delivery was 
delayed by a year from February 2002 to February 2003, further delay was due to first 
infrared sensor that had significant defects in flight software involving sensor’s ability to 
maintain earth coverage and track missiles while orbiting the earth in system test in 
November 2002 resulting in further postponements of delivery[GAO, 2003]. (Missing 
control structure)  This is because of the communication between the sensor development 
team and flight software team was not structured, resulting in integration issues. 
Further due to signal weaknesses in HEO sensor, which had delayed and increased the 
risk, SBIRS continued to experience technical issues in GEO signal processing software 
development and HEO-2 payload software qualification testing after HEO sensor 
delivery[GAO, 2003]. (Inadequate control enforcement).Requirements of the sensor 
were not understood properly, so sensor development had many problems. 
As SBIRS High had problems with sensor chip assembly development needed for sensor 
detector arrays and pointing control assembly software development and control gyro 
reference assembly also failed during life testing in Increment 1 and ground software 
problems resulted in two-year slip[GAO, 2003]. (Inadequate control enforcement) This 
is because of the complexity of the technology.  
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There were 148 defective EMI frequencies, which would lead to mission failure, of 
which 39 design modifications were made and 7 were granted waivers as it would not 
cause performance problems[GAO, 2008]. There were process failures, stringent 
requirements and the subcontractor did not implement the EMI control plan which was 
agreed in EMI design review[GAO, 2008] (inadequate control enforcement). This is 
because the improper process was adopted leading to defects. Further, no contractor was 
clearly responsible for integrating HEO sensor with the host bus[GAO, 2008]. (Missing 
control). This is because there was no clear understanding of individual contractor’s 
responsibilities, so DOD did not bother to bring in new processes in place. 
Two late design changes were made to improve GEO satellites success, 80 amp battery 
was to be replaced with 100 amps battery to improve operational reliability with the 
estimate of $15 million but the cost performance report in June 2003 shows the contractor 
was having difficulty assessing the specifications of the battery resulting in schedule 
delays and increased cost. And the second change was to modify the solar cell panel to 
resolve power deficiency for which the impact on cost was not yet determined[GAO, 
2003].(Inadequate control structure). This is because the design had to change after the 
clarity of requirements. 
SBIRS High technology integration was a high risk due to insufficient time as by June 
2003 only 58 percent of GEO sensor integration, assembly, test and checkout work was 
completed with $2million of work behind schedule[GAO, 2003]. Software development 
of ground system efforts was behind schedule by 32 percent by November 2006[GAO, 
2007]. (Inadequate control structure). This is because, although there were schedules 
to complete the sensor integration and ground system development, the schedule did not 
facilitate the delivery of the products leading to delays. 
The first time integration of flight software was exercised in a new system, the proto-
qualification had to be tested using simulators or flight hardware so transition to facilitate 
the operational use had added complexity in integration and test for GEO 2 as flight 
software would be operationally used in development testing which led to remaining 
SBIRS program at risk[Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005]. (Inadequate control 
structure). This is because the technology was new so the progress in the process could 
not be determined. 
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Lockheed Martin did project the righteous design completion of 50% but DOD allowed 
Lockheed Martin to proceed with the development which was the cause of the major 
design failures and changes. This led to defects in test and design changes due to defects 
which led to delays and cost overruns. 
Designated Approval Authority had not followed the norms by issuing the permission 
to operate, which had violated Department of Defense Information Security 
Certification Authority. And to allow IHC to operate incorrectly issued Interim 
Authority to operate, System Security Authorization Agreement is violated. 
Defense Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation 
A review was conducted in September 2002 to June 2003 to evaluate development testing 
of flight software for two ground segments: Highly Elliptical Orbit Intersegment 
Telemetry, Tracking and Commanding; and Highly Elliptical Orbit Early-On-Orbit Test 
Mission Processing for completeness, adequacy to testing including planning, execution, 
and reporting, as a result, validation of security, penetration test of system security 
features for HEO were found to be incomplete, leading to HEO test data to be doubted 
and HEO capability to test, assess and support SBIRS was contested[DOD, 2003]. 
(Inadequate control enforcement). This is because the capability did not undergo the 
required control structures leading to mission failure. 
The program office did not implement Airforce instruction 99-101 “Developmental Test 
and Evaluation” also SMM tool was not used to track the progress of the program and 
all critical test plans and reports were not signed off, thus without effective management 
and oversight of development and testing, the program had the risk of repeating the 
problems identified during the program recertification[DOD, 2003]. (Inadequate control 
enforcement) This is because the Airforce instruction did not suit the process of 
development. 
Systems Engineering Integration Team 
GEO P/L configuration is different from HEO P/L and complex, latent defects were 
discovered in the manufacturing process of HEO in integration and test sequence leading 
to delays in the schedule[Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005].(Inadequate process 
model) This is due to the technology complexity. System engineering integration team is 
responsible for validating requirements in test and found integration defects. 
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Airforce Operational Test and Evaluation (AFOTEC) 
The problems uncovered in thermal vacuum testing were not identified earlier, as test 
beds were developed in parallel had defects which proved difficult to distinguish between 
testbeds and flight software issues; oversubscription of testbeds and lack of simulation 
resources had led to high-risk areas such as timing of stored programs which were not 
tested for insufficient modelling and lack of robustness[GAO, 2008]. (Missing control 
structure). This is because at every stage there is no check post to evaluate the credibility 
of progress to the next stage in the process. 
Compressed timeline, issues due to shared facilities at overseas relay ground stations, 
delay in performance validation testing of increment 1 ground software, inadequate 
testbed design and scope, simulation tests needed, accelerated deployment of low 
component in 2004, significant improvement in SBIRS High requirements over DSP and 
inadequate HWIL testbeds in OT&E has resulted in increased risk and schedule delays 
and cost overruns[DOD, 2003]. (Too much of control enforcement, incorrect process 
model). This is because the schedule was very tight and did not incorporate the safety 
cushion thus pushing problems to the end state.  
Ground software development efforts were delayed due to database problems and the 
total size of software equivalent lines of code which impacted the schedule in system 
test[GAO, 2007]. In addition software, development and test efforts had integration and 
total performance problems due to combined SPA and Pointing Control Assembly 
hardware and software elements and faulty hardware and software design of HEO/GEO 
flight computers and problems with ‘halt’ anomalies of single board computer. HEO P/L 
Single Board Computers had problems, there were three occurrences of unexplained P/L 
anomaly in halt as all the P/L telemetry data was lost and P/L did not respond to 
commands in thermal vacuum testing of HEO 1 in 2003[Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 2005]. As the telemetry data was lost no conclusions could be drawn and this 
problem repeated in second P/L thermal vacuum testing as well[Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, 2005]. (Asynchronous evolution) This is because the delays in the 
development had affected the test, which delayed further. 
AFOTEC found major defects in the test due to design problems. In effect, the design 
problems were due to DOD authorizing Lockheed Martin to proceed with development 
with only 50% design completion. The rushed environment did not have enough 
resources to carry out the test for the incomplete software. 
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Department of Defense 
The decline in the defense budget, consolidation of the aerospace industry and growing 
competition for fewer programs, resulting in increased cost efficiency by transferring 
program responsibilities to contractors with less government oversight[Younossi et al., 
2008]. The acquisition reform measures eliminated usual cost and technical risk 
assessment data recording, increased technological complexity and reduced acquisition 
workforce due to downsizing challenged the knowledge to assess the technical and 
system engineering progress of the program[Younossi et al., 2008]. (Inadequate control 
structure). This is because the efficiency was not indicated as a requirement in the 
process. 
The DOD has allowed waivers, design completion requirements were bypassed, and test 
certification procedures were not adopted which had surmounted to building relaxed 
environment. In addition to these, budget pressure and increased cost efficiency have 
expected contractors to perform more with less. These had led to inertia in the system. 
Constraints categorized for each controller 
In Figure 20 SPO had missing control structures in assessing the risks involved in 
planning schedules, inadequate control enforcement in planning the development of 
technical specifications and to the extent, the process controls were needed. Inadequate 
control structures were found in understanding and integrating the progress made in 
every department; in the risk assessment of the program; all departments were allowed 
to operate without restrictions, and the delivery of the software were not monitored. 
Asynchronous evolution was experienced in technical performance which led to 
schedule slips and cost growth and due to lack of appropriation over the departments. 
Airforce had inadequate control enforcement of monitoring the progress of the process. 
Lockheed Martin had inadequate control enforcement on requirements of the project; 
architectural decisions were not foreseeing the future; requirements were with inadequate 
clarity; technology complexity had made the project unpredictable; process failures 
resulted in delays. There were missing control structures due to lack of adequate 
information about the project beforehand which led to the distribution of contract 
failures. Inadequate control structures were the result of design changes, schedule delays, 
the flexibility of the system was planned inadequately. Defense Information technology 
security certification and accreditation had inadequate control enforcement as the 
resources required were not planned ahead. 
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Developmental Test and Evaluation had inadequate control enforcement as there was 
lack of control over the project. Designated Approval Authority had not followed 
correct procedures for the test. Systems Engineering Integration Team had 
inadequate process model in the entire development process. AFOTEC had missing 
control structures to pre-plan for resources. Too much of control was enforced at the 
beginning of the project due to inadequate planning. Asynchronous evolution was 
experienced due to cascading effects of delays. DOD had inadequate control structures 
as it could not shield against external influences. 
Constraints violations for each controller 
Thus in Figure 20, SPO had inadequate planning, coordination problems, control issues 
and lack of organizational drive to report the true picture of the status of the program to 
DOD.  
 Airforce also had coordination problems and DOD was left uninformed.   
 
 Lockheed Martin lacked disciplined approach to the entire program which led to planning issues. 
These problems were reported to DOD.   
 
 Defense Information technology security certification and accreditation could not plan ahead 
leading to improper resource allocation which was notified to SPO.  
 
 Developmental Test and Evaluation lacked control over the project resulting in delays which 
were notified to Airforce.  
 
 Designated Approval Authority had not followed correct procedures and Systems Engineering 
Integration Team had development process problems which were reported to SPO.  
 
 AFOTEC had planning issues which were reported to DOD, DOD had reports from SPO, 
Airforce, Lockheed Martin, and AFOTEC on the program and problems in the process.  
 
 DOD had experienced a false sense of the program and visualized the goodness that will shower 
to advance the program to success.  
 
 GAO that is responsible for auditing the program, had reported to DOD and relaxed on advising 
DOD to take action. So GAO is indirectly responsible for the failure of DOD and DOD is 
responsible for the failure of the program. So GAO and DOD are considered as missing control 
structures (represented in dotted lines in Figure 20). 
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Figure 20  Represents the control structured that had disappeared over time and become ineffective. (Dotted lines) 
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The accident was to place all the applications on a single processor, this accident is the 
consequence of missing control structures, inadequate control structures, the asynchronous 
evolution of negligence to deviate from the process over time, inadequate control 
enforcement, the process model was not understood and the process model in this accident 
were found inadequate. As shown in Figure 20 DOD had all the circumstances which led to 
changes in control structures causing the accident which evolved over a period to the 
consequence of the accident. It is argued in this research that GAO that has the responsibility 
of continuously assessing the changes in the control structures is responsible for the accident 
than the DOD. As it is shown here that the GAO being the auditing wing of government 
bears the major challenge of taking the program through to success by maintaining smooth 
operations of DOD. When there are control structure changes that are not adapted to the 
expected level of rigor required for the continuous process change, it relaxes the expectation 
of the hierarchical controls leading to negligence which builds over time to result in the 
accident. GAO over time had set a pace towards the accident by affecting the controls under 
its guidance, this being DOD. Although there are wider influences, in this case study, only 
the accident context is considered to analyze the impact of the GAO on DOD which has 
resulted in the disappearance of DOD in this context. 
The missing control structures start with thermal vacuum testing where it is realized that the 
problems in the flight software were beyond controllable due to the heavy amount of defects 
that had piled up and an excessive amount of workarounds had weakened the framework 
leading to a non-recoverable state. The redesign efforts began at that stage which was the 
consequence of the previous state of the system (i.e. design failure). It will be detailed 
hereunder, the consequence of the accident was the response of the process failures to 
continuously evolve towards the accident. The initial stage of the process (the design phase) 
is proven to be irrelevant to current context thereby the initial context which was right, 
proves to be eroded over time to the extent that it becomes the root cause of the problem. 
Here the original design started with two processors with distributed flight software which 
had been proven as “wrong design” and the new design so adopted was to place flight 
software on one single processor which was proven as “right design”.  In the following 
sections, it will be shown that the NASA’s ability to scrap the right design and to adopt the 
primitive design for pacing itself. 
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Correlation between failures and missing controllers 
This section will explain the interaction failures and assign specific controllers to the failed 
interactions. In the above section, interaction failures were analyzed in every controller and 
how these failures affected the entire organization and the program was discussed. These 
failures are analyzed for their influence by connecting the failures on the entire picture of 
the program that was responsible, will be correlated to the identified missing 
controllers/organizations. The missing organizations that correspond to the collective 
failures will be identified in the section below. The inferences (depicted in italics) derived 
from the above section will be detailed to understand the correlation between the collective 
failures and the identified missing controllers. 
SBIRS Program Office 
The SPO has performed to its best by proving adherence to DOD’s pace, a pace that was set 
to adopt a relaxed attitude. There were process failures, these failures took the same the path 
always, creating a pattern of a break in the process, DOD being the end of the process which 
was left waiting for the process flow to the end. This scenario seems like to have mounted 
up expectations for DOD, but secretly SPO did know the results of the DOD’s initiatives. 
Unfortunately, SPO maintained a good face of the program. This scenario will be detailed 
hereunder. 
The contractor seems to have taken advantage of the inadequate control structure in the risk 
assessment process, as government oversight had reduced, giving the contractors 
autonomous control on assessing the risk criteria and DOD was not able to assess the 
efficiency of individual risk levels assigned to every risk. Thus resulting in the carriage being 
led by horses at their own whims. 
The program had suffered from the estimation of problems resulting in underestimating the 
risk and overestimating the efficiency gain in the cost due to inadequate control structure 
in DOD process in the performance of the program efficiency which had led to inaccurate 
risk levels being graded resulting in failure of process to determine which process has to be 
prioritized thereby leading to a disastrous outcome. 
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The flight software development and integration activities were given high-risk ratings, still, 
the risks were not mitigated year after year (1996, 1999 and 2004). The lethargy was built 
in by the time it reached the 2007 thermal vacuum testing failure when DOD was ready to 
accept any decision to move forward without much thought. This shows inadequate control 
structure in DOD’s process with inertia built in. 
The schedule variance was very high which led to deferring of certain functions but since 
flight software could not be deferred until after launch, the pace of software development 
was increased and more risky functions like integration efforts were postponed. The original 
problem lies with the assessment of the functionalities required and the schedule baseline to 
depend on this assessment, which leads to a process of risk assessment that could not assess 
the risks involved, leading to inappropriate schedule to be baselined. Thus the missing 
control structure in the process lies with DOD’s risk assessment process which did not keep 
pace. 
The requirement phase was done in parallel with design leading to many changes in design 
and development did not appreciate the efforts of the design team to cover up for program 
deficiencies holding the bag for unnecessary complications in the development and test. The 
program should have adopted rigorous military initiatives. This is again a clear inadequate 
control enforcement of processes by DOD.    
Due to technology complexity, the program did not cope with the complexity leading to 
delays and cost overruns. This is again a case of the inadequate process model in DOD’s 
list of process failures. 
SPO had risk assessment failures, risk mitigation failures, schedule delays, requirement 
clarity failures and design failures. Technology complexity seemed like the big universe 
which cannot be solved at this juncture. DOD had propagated the lethargy in its constitution 
which had promoted SPO to stand up in pride to face DOD even with the failures in the 
program. GAO that is supposed to be auditing and reporting to DOD with recommendations 
for improvement did attain salvation very early in the program which led to GAO being 
reluctant of accepting the failures. Thus there was no indulgence from GAO to delve deep 
into the problems. 
 
Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Processes | STAMP analysis of SBIRS Architectural Accident 
Sujatha Mohanram Post Graduate Research 81 
Department of Defense (DOD) 
DOD being the feeding member of the process in the process loop which was started by 
itself, the process is the flow to produce the success of the program. DOD does create the 
loop of processes which flows in and out of various organizations in the different stages of 
the process. DOD had diligently forwarded the process standards of lethargy which had been 
propagated through the entire process. This standard was adopted for having a smooth flow 
of the process, thus the inertia was built in as an intrinsic factor. This will be stated in detail 
hereunder.   
There were process escapes in the program leading to problems being escalated to various 
degrees resulting in DOD simply turning away from dealing with such situations where a 
perfect solution is not visible. This is due to inadequate control enforcement of the 
processes by DOD. 
The delays from program perspective than on individual organizational perspective was an 
accumulative cause of irresponsiveness which was built in over time. The cumulative effect 
resulted in mission failure. This is clearly inadequate control enforcement of processes by 
DOD. 
The program lacked information flow from the contractors to DOD resulting in DOD to be 
relaxed with the spoon-fed information encouraging the DOD to engage in building a 
rigmarole of negligence which has led to a state where the program went out of control.   
The compressed schedule led to inadequate software to be delivered to test which led to a 
cyclic movement from test to development and back, leading to delays and cost overruns. 
This is again a clear case of inadequate control structure in DOD’s process to boost the 
efficiency in the projections of schedule estimates. 
The cascading effect in the process was responsible for the transfer of redundancies from 
one stage to another leading to inertia in the total system. This is clearly a case of 
asynchronous evolution in DOD’s process.   
Waivers in different stages led to some processes to be bypassed resulting in defects and 
rework and cost escalation. This is because of the inadequate control enforcement of the 
process by DOD. 
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Two late design changes which did change the pace of the delivery process, which led to an 
imbalance in the development due to requirement clarification at the later stages. The DOD’s 
process to allow waivers for design and specification to be done in parallel leading to 
changes in design at later stages. This is an inadequate control structure of DOD’s ability 
to accommodate new requirements creep which led to compressed process to accommodate 
change. 
There were many problems in development integration which were not identified beforehand 
due to unpredicted challenges in technology resulting in complexity gain in various stages 
of the process. The process itself became responsible for building complexity as intrinsic 
factor, which had manifested as design problem rather than simplifying the process, DOD 
had landed up simplifying the architecture. This is a clear case of inadequate control 
structure in the process evolution to deliver the program effectively.    
The first time integration of flight software was not well planned leading to complexity in 
technology being transferred to unplanned processes which led to a hard landing which in 
turn implanted itself back into flight software development. This is again a case of 
inadequate control structure in the DOD’s process to accommodate a new process of first-
time integration. 
The delays in the development led to delays in the test and the test had to bear the cost of the 
delays. The design changes brought in by the problems in the test were due to lack of process 
to transfer the complexity over to next stage in the process that is why there were reverse 
flows back to design. This is an asynchronous evolution of the process in the DOD towards 
problems. 
The complexity of technology was seen to cause impact in the development and in turn into 
testing leading to cascading effect of complexity of technology. This effect is due to the 
inability of DOD’s processes to facilitate the complexity by simplifying the process resulting 
from asynchronous evolution. 
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DOD had managed to pass the inertia as a standard through the process for following 
processes to take advantage of. This process was adhered to with an ambition to match the 
pace with each other to form a cohesive conglomerate. This led to a belief that everything is 
going well and failures were never admitted which did project a sense of oneness in the 
delivery of the program as a success. GAO could not detect the variances which are where 
GAO fails to assess the program’s progress. 
Lockheed Martin 
The flight software development team had many integration problems, major integration 
problems were with sensor development team which proves that coordination of teams had 
missing control structure in DOD’s processes which led to integration failures and delays. 
The test had to see repeat problems in the design leading to a cyclic response to the process 
due to inadequate control enforcement of processes that should have been adhered to and 
should have been enforced by DOD.  
Lockheed Martin is the major contractor, had not followed processes that were mandated. 
These process failures had led to rework and redesign. DOD did not notice the first sign of 
process failure. GAO was relaxed as it was not keeping a tap on changes in the process flow. 
Airforce Operational Test and Evaluation (AFOTEC) 
The testing of flight software was not done properly, as the thermal vacuum testing problems 
were not identified at earlier stages of the test, thereby proving that the control structures in 
place could not identify the lack of rigor in the process, thus proving the missing control 
structure in DOD’s testing and development processes. 
Airforce instruction of 99-101 Development test and evaluation was not implemented in the 
program which was conveniently avoided so that the progress could not be monitored by 
DOD. This is evident from the yearly voluntary submission of progress report which even 
DOD had been stunted by such an admirable display of obedience. This is a clear case of 
inadequate control enforcement by DOD. 
Some of HEO capabilities were not tested leading to HEO data to be not trusted in the test 
process which led to confidence loss in the process. DOD did not enforce the testing 
certification process properly resulting in inadequate control enforcement. 
Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Processes | STAMP analysis of SBIRS Architectural Accident 
Sujatha Mohanram Post Graduate Research 84 
DOD was countered with its own projected standards by very conveniently not following 
Airforce Instructions in the test which was a stunning response to DOD. GAO seems to be 
out of the picture. 
USSPACECOM 
The functionalities that were defined to requirements were not clear enough which led to 
confusion in the contract management perspective that became more evident when it was 
realized that no contractor was assigned the responsibility of integrating HEO sensor to the 
host bus. There is a missing control structure in DOD’s process which identifies the 
functionalities from the requirements to contract assignment. 
DOD had all the organizations with assigned responsibilities, but they had not predicted new 
processes that had to be incorporated which led to a slip in the process that affected the 
following processes adversely. GAO was not agile enough to detect this slip in the process. 
System Engineering Integration Team 
There seems to be a clear case of process failure when EMI frequencies were corrected with 
design modification where the requirements were not clarified, and on top of that, the control 
plans were not adhered to which resulted due to inadequate control enforcement of 
processes by DOD. 
DOD’s built-in inertia is evident in the SEIT, which is struggling to cope with process 
failures. GAO was not preemptive to assess the process requirements thereby leading to 
unplanned loops in process.  
Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
Due to the compressed timeline, resource limitation, more technology testing, and improved 
requirements all led to too much of control being enforced in the process leading to escapism 
in the process which had implanted inertia towards reporting back to DOD. This led to DOD 
to give up on the program, thus taking off control out of its grips. This is a clear case of the 
incorrect process model. 
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The processes introduced by DOD had poor performance, but the lapse in the process was 
not compensated which in effect was carried forward with the program. The assumptions 
taken at early stages were not corrected to stabilize thereby the complexity was built in as in 
the case of COTS. GAO had the responsibility of assessing the process imbalances and still, 
no action was taken. (Inadequate control enforcement). This is because of negligence in 
assessing the requirements. 
Government oversight was not managed appropriately leading to contractors taking 
advantage to produce a biased estimation of cost and schedule. Later to meet the cost and 
schedule, processes were granted waivers which increased program risk. GAO did not stop 
this evolution of inertia in the process. (Asynchronous evolution). This is because of 
negligence to adhere to the set process leading to problems in assessment processes. 
GAO has had a tremendous lapse in assessing at various stages leading to inappropriate 
standards being set for assessing the information required to be assessed being moderated 
according to the situation, there seems to be more brewing than what was actually reported 
for assessment. The real sense of negligence has been portrayed by GAO for others to make 
use of the situation for their benefit. GAO has encouraged such a false self-esteem to be their 
honor. In favor of GAO, which has the name to be righteous and demanding that has 
promoted other organizations to be over submissive taking the strides to the limits of other 
organization’s capabilities which has led to the suppressed deceptive outpour.  DOD was 
caught is a line of fire of GAO and unfortunately, DOD had lost its perseverance to adapt to 
changing expectations. DOD seems to have been a very good partner in crime. 
It is the GAO that had been indirectly responsible for the failure of DOD leading to the 
accident. GAO gets DOD to disappear from the program while itself merging in and losing 
its projected pride. Standing by GAO, the land does seem far offshore than one could dream 
of, it is an understanding that GAO did try to cope with the other’s expectations to please 
everyone. It is time for the volcano to erupt, which will bring severe GAO to light by 
sanctioning honor to be projected, hopefully in due course.  
Thus Figure 20 projects the controllers that had failures which resulted in an accident. These 
failures are mapped to controllers as inferred from the above section in the table below 
(Table 1). 
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SPO problems 
Risk assessment problem 
Prioritization of mitigation efforts 
Improper handling of escalated risks 
Improper schedule baseline based on risk assessment 
Inadequate process implementation 
Lockheed Martin 
Inadequate process to handle integration problems 
Inadequate reverse process to solve the identification of 
problems 
Airforce Operational Test and Evaluation (AFOTEC) 
Inadequate process in performance monitoring of the 
process 
Inadequate and timely corrective action to bring 
confidence in the process 
USSPACECOM 
Inadequate process of assigning contractors to 
functionalities  
System Engineering Integration Team 
Inadequate process monitoring 
DOD problems 
Turning away from dealing with problems 
Inadequate initiatives to motivate the 
organizations to work together 
Assumed goal to reach the efficiency 
Blame culture of transferring problems to some 
other section 
Improper enforcement of processes 
Inadequate flexibility of processes 
Identification of solutions to smooth running of 
the program 
Inadequate flexibility to adapt to the change 
Inadequate planning of defect handling process 
Inadequate process to handle technology 
complexity 
Cumulative failure resulted in accident 
GAO 
Too much of control on the process 
Inadequate assessment of process failures 
Inadequate monitoring of the processes 
Table 1 Interaction failures mapped to controllers 
SPO is responsible for the entire program’s success, which had problems with the risk 
assessment that was dependent on various other factors as discussed earlier. As risk 
assessment was the area where failures were noticed, the program had the cascading effect 
on design, development, and test. Lockheed Martin being the major contractor was 
responsible for development and test of the software, had problems with coordinating with 
other teams and the effect of risk assessment led to problems in development life cycle 
leading to cyclic movement of the blame. AFOTEC had process problems in the operation 
of the test. The test had the cascading effects of risk assessment from the development and 
design. USSPACECOM had missed requirements to map to the contractors which were 
realized later in the process. Thus the process was not monitored to ensure appropriate 
procedures were followed. SEIT had the same problem as in USSPACECOM. DOD had 
process failures in dealing with technology complexity, defect handling, adopting change 
processes, smooth execution of processes, flexibility to adopt new processes, process 
adherence problems, coordination processes, realistic planning process, the process to 
mediate goal between organizations and not enough resources to deal with problems. These 
process problems had accumulated to form an accident. GAO’s restricted constraints led to 
an artificial show of obedience which led to failures in the monitoring of process which in 
turn led to assessment failures in auditing. 
Thus GAO initiated the environment and DOD adhered to the GAO’s expectations. The 
organizations responsible for the accident are DOD and GAO. So the in Figure 20 DOD and 
GAO are represented with disappearing controllers as their influence or noninfluence had 
caused the accident. 
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The actual cause of the accident is still not clear at this stage of STAMP analysis as the 
controllers are analyzed by using static snapshots. Although the analysis points to the 
organizations responsible for the failures, their influence on the accident is not clear in the 
overall picture. The clarity of the cause of the accident is derived from the dynamic process 
which will collate all the controllers and failures and link it to the accident. In the next 
section, the link between various failures leading to the accident will be analyzed. 
3.4.3 Dynamic Process Model 
Dynamic process model will prove the importance of GAO‘s role in auditing and monitoring 
the process. GAO had the constraints and controls in place to monitor the system, but over 
time these had degraded. The system had evolved towards the state of the high risk that even 
the slight change would result in a catastrophic failure. The changes in the system are 
complex and the resulting system dynamics are unpredictable. To have an understanding of 
accident prevention, an analysis of static structures alone will not suffice, the dynamic 
influence of the system which is an intrinsic factor has to be understood. The system will 
describe the dynamic nature of changes that are brought and the responsive changes that the 
system is under. The theory behind this change of the system which is underlying causes the 
influence on the system which has to be understood for prevention of negative effects on the 
system as every system has its own context which influences the effect of the change.  
Figure 28 shows the system dynamic model for the SBIRS accident. The basic structures in 
the model are variables, stocks (represented by small rectangles), and flows (double arrows 
into and out of stocks) and phases in development life cycle (represented by large 
rectangles). Lines with arrows between the structures represent causality links, with a 
negative polarity means that a change in the original variable leads to change in the opposite 
direction of the target variable.  
The system which is influenced by the feedback loops over time degrades and they are 
balanced by the government regulations and oversight which controls the behavior of the 
influenced system.  The system here is influenced by other organization’s expectations. They 
are under the “pleasing factor” influence, which is when a new initiative is introduced, every 
organization involved is equally motivated to see the success banner of the initiative, so the 
initiative is not evaluated for its merits rather for the mere satisfaction of creating a success 
outlook. The system which is influenced to please others is more fragile as the true outlook 
of the entire system is very difficult to evaluate.  
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GAO had the responsibility of assessing the progress of the program, GAO had analyzed the 
progress and reported that contractor was showing overly optimistic progress estimation as 
troubles in assembly, integration, and test resulting in overrunning cost and schedule was 
evident[GAO, 2007]. As ground software development was accelerated, databases delivered 
late had affected the development, GAO had assessed and reported the capability of the 
contractor to deliver databases[GAO, 2007]. GAO had expressed concerns on DOD’s 
workforce reduction, which had affected the cost analysis[GAO, 2007]. GAO had warned 
DOD of previous satellite programs that had taken longer and had cost higher due to 
inadequate performance requirements defined at the beginning but there were many changes 
in performance requirements which led to schedule overruns in SBIRS program as 
well[GAO, 2007]. GAO had strong recommendations to DOD of achieving stable design 
before entering product demonstration but DOD did pass the critical design review with only 
50% of design completion resulting in major changes to design at later stages[GAO, 2003]. 
The SBIRS program had been restructured several times due to the cost increase, schedule 
delays and revised goals in 2002, 2004, and 2005[GAO, 2008]. GAO had documented all 
the problems in the processes but DOD had turned blind to its warnings[GAO, 2007]. 
The failures in the organizations were extracted out to understand the relativity to the 
development lifecycle in order to analyze the dynamic nature of failures affecting the system 
leading to the accident. The list below explains the failures related to the individual phases 
in the development lifecycle. These failures in the development cycle are depicted in Figure 
28 to understand the dynamic process model of STAMP accident analysis. 
 
Figure 21 Risk-Dynamic process model 
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Risk (Figure 1Figure 21) 
 As government oversight had reduced, giving the contractors autonomous control on 
assessing the risk criteria leading to inadequate risk assessment process.  
 DOD was not able to assess the efficiency of individual risk levels assigned to every 
risk leading to inappropriate risk categories defined. 
 Underestimating the risk and overestimating the efficiency gain in the cost. 
 The flight software development and integration activities were given high-risk 
ratings, still, the risks were not mitigated year after year (1996, 1999 and 2004). 
 The pace of software development was increased and more risky functions like 
integration efforts were postponed resulting in schedule variance. 
 Risk assessment process that could not assess the risks involved leading to 
inappropriate schedule to be baselined. 
 
Figure 22 Requirement – Dynamic Process model 
Requirement (Figure 22) 
 The requirement phase was done in parallel with design leading to many changes in 
design and development. 
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 The test had to see repeat problems in the design leading to a cyclic response to 
process. 
 The program did not cope with the complexity leading to delays and cost overruns 
due to technology complexity. 
 There were process escapes in the program leading to problems being escalated to 
various degrees. 
 The delays from the program resulted in irresponsiveness which was built in over 
time. 
 The program lacked information flow from the contractors to DOD resulting in DOD 
to be relaxed with the spoon fed information. 
 The compressed schedule led to inadequate software to be delivered to test which 
led to a cyclic movement from test to development and back, leading to delays and 
cost overruns. 
 
Figure 23 Design – Dynamic Process Model 
Design (Figure 23) 
 Waivers in different stages led to some processes to be bypassed resulting in defects 
and rework and cost escalation. 
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 Two late design changes which did change the pace of the delivery process, which 
led to an imbalance in the development due to requirement clarification at the later 
stages. 
 The DOD’s process to allow waivers for design and specification to be done in 
parallel leading to changes in design at later stages. 
 
Figure 24 Development – Dynamic Process Model 
Development (Figure 24) 
 There were many problems in development integration which were not identified 
beforehand due to unpredicted challenges in technology resulting in complexity gain 
in various stages of the process. 
 The flight software development team had many integration problems, major 
integration problems were with sensor development team. 
 The first time integration of flight software was not well planned leading to 
complexity in technology being transferred to unplanned processes which led to a 
hard landing which in turn implanted itself back into flight software development. 
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 The functionalities that were defined to requirements were not clear enough which 
led to confusion in the contract management perspective that became more evident 
when it was realized that no contractor was assigned the responsibility of integrating 
HEO sensor to the host bus. 
 There seems to be a clear case of process failure when EMI frequencies were 
corrected with design modification where the requirements were not clarified, and on 
top of that, the control plans were not adhered to. 
 The process itself became responsible for building complexity as intrinsic factor, 
which had manifested as design problems rather than simplifying the process, DOD 
had landed up simplifying the architecture. 
 
Figure 25 Test – Dynamic Process model 
Test (Figure 25) 
 The delays in development led to delays in test and test had to bear the cost of the 
delays. 
 The testing of flight software was not done properly, as the thermal vacuum testing 
problems were not identified at earlier stages of test 
 Airforce instruction of 99-101 Development test and evaluation was not implemented 
in the program which was conveniently avoided so that the progress could not be 
monitored by DOD. 
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 Some of HEO capabilities were not tested leading to HEO data to be not trusted in 
the test process which led to confidence loss in the process. 
 The design changes brought in by the problems in the test were due to lack of process 
to transfer the complexity over to the next stage in the process that is why there were 
reverse flows back to design. 
 The complexity of technology was seen to cause impact in the development and in 
turn into testing leading to cascading effect of technology complexity.  
 
Figure 26 Program – Dynamic Process Model 
Program (Figure 26) 
 Due the compressed timeline, resource limitation, more technology testing, and 
improved requirements all led to too much of control being enforced in the process 
leading to escapism in the process which had implanted inertia towards reporting 
back to DOD 
 The processes introduced by DOD had poor performance, but the lapse in the 
process was not compensated which in effect was carried forward with the program. 
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 The assumptions taken at early stages were not corrected to stabilize thereby the 
complexity was built in as in the case of COTS. 
 Government oversight was not managed appropriately leading to contractors taking 
advantage to produce a biased estimation of the cost and schedule. 
 To meet the cost and schedule, processes were granted waivers which increased 
program risk. 
 The schedule variance was very high which resulted in the increase in the pace of 
software development and more risky functions like integration efforts were 
postponed. The original problem lies with the assessment of the functionalities 
required and the schedule baseline to depend on this assessment leading to 
inappropriate schedule to be baselined which resulted in cost overrun. 
 There were process escapes in the program leading to problems being escalated to 
various degrees resulting in DOD simply turning away. 
 The cascading effect in the process was responsible for the transfer of redundancies 
from one stage to another leading to inertia in the total system. 
 Waivers in different stages led to some processes to be bypassed resulting in defects 
and rework and cost escalation. 
 There were many problems in development integration which were not identified 
beforehand due to unpredicted challenges in technology resulting in complexity gain 
in various stages of the process. The process itself became responsible for building 
complexity as intrinsic factor. 
 The test had to see repeat problems in the design leading to a cyclic response to a 
process which led to defects which were transferred to design phase and back to the 
test. 
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 The functionalities that were defined to requirements were not clear enough which 
led to confusion in the contract management perspective that became more evident 
when it was realized that no contractor was assigned the responsibility of integrating 
HEO sensor to the host bus which led to program inefficiency. 
 The processes introduced by DOD had poor performance, but the lapse in the 
process was not compensated which in effect was carried forward with the program 
resulting in negligence being built in the process. 
As shown in Figure 28 Risk, Requirement, Design, Development, Test, and Program are 
phases of development life cycle. SBIRS is DOD’s program initiative. Architectural failures 
and Redesign of software architecture are the stocks. Although there were many failures 
accumulated towards the accident, one such failure link represented in Figure 28 is 
explained. Inaccurate risk assessment leading to inefficiency in determining the risk levels, 
which led to an underestimation of risks thereby leading to problems in the prioritization of 
mitigation in the Risk phase of the life cycle.  
This prioritization of mitigation led to requirements problems which were due to the 
requirements with not enough clarity, as HEO sensor host bus was not assigned to any 
contractor which was due to contractor management problem in the Requirement phase of 
the life cycle. 
These requirement issues led to unnecessary complications as requirements were done in 
parallel with design in the Design phase. These complications in the design phase led to 
problems in the flight software development, which led to flight software integration 
problems and resulted in defects in the Development phase of the life cycle. 
These defects led to design changes which were not planned (lack of process). Flight 
software development defects had failures in thermal vacuum testing. The repeat problems 
in Test phase led to lethargy as flight software development which underwent design 
changes as the problems repeated, which led to cyclic processes thereby leading to 
technology complexity due to design problems. Later when there was no other path ahead, 
the simplified design was opted for. Flight software underwent a redesign of software 
architecture. The rate of redesign failures had led to architectural failure as the redesign was 
based on single core architecture which would in future lead to accidents (Figure 27).  
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Figure 27 Accident – Dynamic Process Model 
The Program phase of the life cycle had problems due to DOD initiating relaxed procedures 
which encouraged negligence in managing the contractor that led to reduced program 
efficiency. The reduced efficiency led to program delays which in turn led to accumulative 
irresponsiveness over time. This will result in mission failure. 
Thus it was identified that the system “Context” was the cause of the accident. As all the 
development phases of the life cycle had failures, the only common factor found, that did 
not attain equilibrium with controllers was the system context. The system context was the 
only unchanged factor in the analysis which remained constant in the case study. 
This mission though did not fail. The current flight software architecture is based on 
multicore processor and has distributed application architecture. Thus the flight software 
architecture must have undergone couple more iterations of the redesign of software 
architecture to attain this refinement in the architecture. And there must have been couple 
more accidents before this refinement in architecture was attained. These accidents are never 
noticed, as the end result of the program is successful. This accident analysis is to understand 
those failures that are not identified as accidents and learn from these accidents to improve 
the efficiency of the program and to efficiently allocate resources to reduce cost overruns.  
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Figure 28 shows the relationship between failures which led to the accident. In order to 
depict the dynamic relationship, the failures are extracted out into the development process 
to show the dynamism of the failures to result in an accident. Here the interaction context is 
understood based on the STAMP. While understanding the interaction context, the context 
of the system as a whole is validated against the interaction context. The system context 
seems to have a strong bearing on the controllers, constraints and the interaction context. As 
the process originated from the DOD, the underlying context of the program bore its signs 
of conformity towards the passed on valor. This became the intrinsic standard which every 
organization was sublimed to accept and follow.  This is when the analysis was encouraged 
to widen the scope of understanding of the system context. When the system contextual 
factors were analyzed, a realization of coaching the system context would help to improve 
individual morale was understood. 
It is the realization of the organizational context that was derived from the accident analysis 
which encouraged the use of contextual factor as the prevention technique. The context is an 
incubator of deriving self-actualization and stabilizing the equilibrium between the past 
experiences and to see beyond the future. To seduce this context though is very difficult, it 
has to be coaxed by the enthusiasm to attain satisfaction of oneself to press ahead of the 
future. The aim is to provide the direction of the individual satisfaction to derive the 
excellence in favor of their own sense of esteem. The organization is made of the 
consciousness which provides a sense of victory in standing together in oneness. This victory 
is what to be achieved to prevent accidents from happening in future.  
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Figure 28 Dynamic model of SBIRS Architectural failure 
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An accident occurs when the underlying context is shaken (Figure 29). The organizations in 
the context are automatically adjusted to fit themselves as self-adjusting measure - a coping 
mechanism. In reality in such a well-coordinated system, it is difficult to isolate the good 
functioning system out, therefore difficult to identify the origin of the accident or even have 
the realization that system is heading towards failure. In this case study, GAO monitors the 
context of the system and the accident is the decision taken to alter the architecture in the 
wrong direction, which is right to the current contextual status. So none of the organizations 
in the context ever had the realization that the accident had taken place. 
In Figure 29 system contextual factor is added to STAMP core principles (Figure 15 ) as the 
context has influenced organizational control structures and constraints that maneuvers the 
behavior of the process to form an equilibrium between the changing constraints and the 
interaction between the hierarchical levels of control. As the change is a continuous process 
the process flow which interacts with the constraints to form an equilibrium, the progress of 
process flow influences the control structures and thereby the resultant of the flow. This 
resultant depends on the context to lead the project to success or failure. This context is what 
to be understood and monitored. This context is added in Figure 29 to STAMP core 
principles to analyze the accident prevention techniques. 
 
Figure 29 Organisational Context 
The analysis carried out here will state the “state of context” before the accident, which led 
to the accident. To prevent such accidents from happening, it is important to understand the 
contextual state so that changes in the controls and constraints could be predicted.  
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In the case study, inaccurate risk assessment led to prioritization of mitigation issues which 
started with inaccurate requirements with not enough clarity which led to contractor 
assignment issues, this issue was realized only in the integration, when there were excessive 
amount of defects which were pushed back as design problems, fed-up with the repeat 
problems from development, test team pushed it back to design, there was a cyclic process 
established. This cyclic process created frustration among all the teams involved, leading to 
technology complexity as problems could not be resolved in development. This back and 
forth in the process had developed unwarranted processes such as workarounds, skipping 
some test procedures, this led to process redundancies which resulted in irresponsiveness 
overtime.  
At this state of the system, the system was ready to accept any changes which will set the 
sailing course, so the old design was scrapped and a new design was adopted which is the 
architectural failure this case study has investigated. In actual course of evolution, waivers 
were blamed to be the cause of this tornado, as it swirled through design and requirements 
as parallel processes, development test and testing simultaneously resulting in the cyclic 
process of repeat problems. 
DOD brought new initiatives, oversight was reduced (effect of TSPR), procedures were 
relaxed and waivers were granted in development processes which led to bypassing certain 
processes, resulting in rework and cost escalations thereby reducing the pace of delivery and 
finally the program was on the brink of failure. This is when the simplified architecture was 
suggested, which came as an escape mechanism from the situation. DOD and GAO 
authorized the design. In the next section, complete description of why this design was 
wrong will be detailed and the reason why it is considered as an architectural failure will be 
analyzed. 
It is understood that the context of the accident is the most prominent factor to be analyzed 
in an accident. As the constraints and controls were changed in the context and response 
could be seen as a flow of the process, while this process is a continuous process which 
brings continuous improvement, the only factor that needs to be controlled would be the 
context. 
The Columbia investigation report identified “broken safety culture” as the cause of the 
accident. The structural secrecy is built into the organization leading to failures[Qureshi, 
2008]. 
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Schein refers to “the culture of a group can now be defined as a pattern of shared basic 
assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and 
internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid, and therefore, to 
be taught to the new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to 
those problems.”[Qureshi, 2008] 
3.4.4 “Context” As Cause of Accident in other case studies 
“I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is 
out, of landing the man on the moon and returning safely to earth” John F Kennedy in an 
address to Congress 25 May 1961. 
The report on Columbia space shuttle accident was reported in “The Nimrod Review” as 
organizational context problem. There were lessons learned from various other accidents 
based on “context” as the cause of the accident. The accidents from RAF Nimrod aircraft, 
Piper Alpha, Kings Cross Fire accident, Space Shuttle Challenger and Columbia and BP 
Texas City [Spence, 2009]. 
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board realized that fundamental element of the 
success of any project is “organizational causes”, so rather than just focusing merely on 
errors and omission by individuals, the context should gain focus in any project to be 
successful[Spence, 2009]. 
There is certainly a message emanating from the accidents in this era, organizational features 
are the most consistent factor in shaping the success of any project. Technology has helped 
to improve various aspects of the organizational agility. Agility is balancing the historical 
perspective and future perspective to develop a defense mechanism against deterrent factors 
that drive the organization towards the ineffectiveness. 
A subservient organizational context is dangerous as it demands compliance to the factors 
that influence which forgoes the individual strengths and conforms to the expected norms 
resulting in the complacency of the influencing factor which over time results in 
irresponsiveness to the instinctive behavior which leads to false sense of valor. This pattern 
is repeated bringing much more under its influence. 
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An organization needs a sampler of organizational context who would be passionate about 
the opportunities of the organizational strengths and would predict the future of trends set 
by innovations for future to prove the success of more innovations to follow the trend. This 
sampler is no more a top official, he is the one who feels the pulse of strengths and aims to 
strengthen the strengths of the organization innovatively. 
3.4.5 Summary of Accident analysis  
The accident cause is the context in which the redesign was introduced. DOD had taken steps 
to confirm with program review board and independent review team before approving the 
redesign efforts. DOD had undertaken all measures for the smooth execution of the program. 
GAO that has the responsibility of assessing and recommending the redesign options had 
analyzed the context of the system and chosen this recommendation of redesign as the 
solution. From this STAMP analysis, it was determined that no specific organization is 
responsible for the cause of the accident but the context in which all the organizations operate 
are treated as a causal factor.  
DOD had many process failures, TSPR was brought in with efficiency as the background 
gain by cutting the bureaucratic procedures. But it turned out to be adverse, with less 
oversight on contractors, and in SAMP, documentation was reduced which missed the details 
needed. The risk assessment strategy of CRIMS was also a failure as it did not consider 
proper risk assessment criteria’s in COEA, the cost-effectiveness was not based on the 
performance, so the cost was not estimated on the real risk. The joint execution team was 
supposed to oversee the progress of the program, which was also a failure as Airforce did 
not involve in the progress of the program, so the rein was left to the contractors. The 
requirements were not properly clarified as USSPACECOM had compromised on 
performance tradeoff. Contractor Logistics support which was assigned to contractors did 
not work on the Airforce terms. SEIT was not properly equipped as the TEMP could not 
predict the risks undertaken by the development team. System Evaluation and Estimation of 
Resources did not carry out software technology risk assessment properly, so there were 
problems in development. 
There were operational failures in the process, the DOD had granted waivers for many 
crucial processes like design and requirements were done in parallel, development testing, 
and testing was done in parallel and design was passed into development with just 50% 
completion which resulted in many major design changes.  
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There were major defects in the test, which were counteracted with workarounds which later 
mounted to be major failures in the test that only design changes could stabilize the software. 
Some of the certification procedures were bypassed which led to the inadequate testing of 
software. SPO had limited ability to oversee the progress of the development due to lack of 
an integrated system to assess the schedule and cost overruns. COTS were assumed to be a 
low risk which was the cause of major problems in HEO.  
All the process failures were complicating the system’s analysis of the real problem. The 
problem of redesigning the software architecture for the sake simplifying the process was 
the accident analyzed here in the case study. The redesign was wrong to place the flight 
software on the single processor and DOD did still approve the redesign. 
DOD had taken all measures to have smooth execution of the program, but it does seem that 
the processes had failures which were either not reported or not taken any action on, thus it 
led to inertia built into the system.  
GAO had reviewed technical documents on flight software and conducted performance 
audits at the office of secretary of defense, space, and missile systems center, Lockheed 
Martin, Defense contract management agency and had assessed various alternatives for 
mitigating flight software problems found in thermal vacuum testing in 2007 and had 
developed a way forward to implement redesign efforts. DOD had approval from program 
review board for a new design for revised cost and schedule. And six independent review 
teams examined the new design and authorized to proceed with formal coding. 
GAO had analyzed the context of DOD, Lockheed Martin and DCMA which was in a state 
of complexity that no way forward could be seen. So GAO had recommended the new design 
to DOD which suited the context well. And GAO was proven right over time as JPL 
developed Mission Data Systems architecture and GSFC developed core Flight software 
which holds the pride of the entire software industry in bringing flight software architecture 
to the dais of architectural achievements. 
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STAMP analysis was chosen as it is based on system theory which considers accidents as 
arising from the interactions among system components and usually does not have a single 
causal factor.[Leveson et al., 2003] As STAMP considers inadequate control or enforcement 
of constraints on the design, development and operation of the systems, accidents such as 
these, involving software architectural design errors, may stem from inadequate control over 
the development process, i.e., if risk is not adequately managed in the design and 
implementation processes[Leveson et al., 2003]. So the STAMP was chosen for the accident 
analysis of this case study. The role of the control in the form of external factors such as 
political factors should also be considered in accident analysis[Leveson et al., 2003]. Thus 
accidents are viewed as flawed processes involving interaction among system 
components[Leveson et al., 2003]. STAMP is considered from three basic concepts: 
Constraints, hierarchical levels of control and process models.[Leveson et al., 2003]  
In the case study, the processes failed, control structures were changed and constraints were 
modified. The STAMP accident model describes these factors as causal factors. The context 
in which organizations operate is what is found as a causal factor in this case study. DOD 
did implement all possible measures for the smooth execution of SBIRS program, but still, 
the processes failed and control structures had changed and constraints such as military 
instructions were not followed. These factors could have led to accident independently, but 
collectively they had a major impact- a loss of $7.8 billion. GAO that was to assess the 
progress could not detect major problems earlier. So the context is blamed for creating 
irresponsiveness resulting in building lethargy and thus inertia.  
The data gathered from the GAO, DOD, and SBIRS program office, Office of 
Undersecretary of Defense, Airforce, Lockheed Martin, and NASA, were analyzed for 
influences of the context of the accident (Table 2).  The contextual factors were examined 
and the relevant factors were weeded out to relate the accident to the context. The accident 
context was derived from the context to ascertain the accident causation. As the context is 
accident cause, this context was separately analyzed and accident context was understood 
from it. This exercise was undertaken as the accident was a very primitive problem 
(architecture), with an assurance that NASA would never have considered this architectural 
decision to be adopted, which encouraged this research to understand the entire program 
context to analyze the circumstances in which such adverse decision was undertaken. This 
research has analyzed 15 years of data to derive this accident analysis. 
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As it is DOD’s context, DOD could have saved this failure by modifying the context as 
shown in Figure 30. It is assumed that if a context is supplied, the other factors might hold 
the safety boundaries. So if the first process in the organization is standardized with the 
required context, the same could be replicated in the following organizations.   
Figure 30 shows organizational context for organisation1 and organization2. The process 
which flows through one organization to another should contain the successful context of 
the project. This context should be enforced into new organizations to ensure the program’s 
success is replicated in all the organizations that are involved in the program.  
The context is recommended to be of military valor which promotes the feeling of pride in 
the execution of the project in the process. This is every person’s self-esteem which finds 
the footing in the progress of the project which sees their potential to attain self-actualization 
as the project progresses and succeeds. The individuals in the context are to be seduced with 
project focus to derive individual satisfaction to attain self-esteem. This context has to be 
deployed in one organization and standardized successful context has to be passed on to 
other organizations. 
 
Figure 30  Recommended organizational context enhancement 
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For example, DOD should have passed context of pride, excellence, potential to excel to 
higher ranks, created an environment of technological supremacy, honored the role models 
and created an environment of courage and conviction in general context. The project-
specific context would be the drive towards the project excellence, knowledge gain, clear 
goals, clear roles and responsibilities and accountabilities. This coaxing should motivate 
individuals to find their goals to attain satisfaction which would be the first step. 
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 Context Factors, Accident Context, Program Problems, Architectural Problems 
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Problems identified in reports Problems identified by this research How these factors contribute to accident 
DOD directives 5000 series were not followed 
  
promising system concepts   architecture so adopted did prove to be a drastic 
failure 
Rigorous to set initial baseline for system performance 
requirements and KPP 
Basic requirements of the mission were foregone. to meet the schedule and cost 
SAMP was the document which collated all aspects of 
the acquisition 
was not appropriate for the military context as more stringent measures were foregone and 
expressive nature of the various aspects of the 
program was eliminated  
Phase I Pre-EMD did not define the design concepts to 
the defined requirement 
many changes in the engineering design as the program 
progressed 
ineffective at that stage of adoption 
requirements were not properly defined resulted in formulating a high-level architecture overthrown for its own good 
COEA was not effectively performed   cost-effectiveness was derived from the performance 
analysis 
Predictability of software delivery 
performance analysis which was not performed on the 
grounds of achieving higher efficiency 
rather it was based on amicable solution among the 
Defence organizations 
Software quality problems 
Cost as Independent Variable was developed to 
maximize the military utility for affordable KPP 
many changes to the specifications in battery and 
power generation aspect of the design 
but the affordability ran out of the logical premise 
The greatest success of SBIRS characteristics was 
contractor empowerment[Jay A. Moody, 1997][Jay A. 
Moody, 1997][Jay A. Moody, 1997][Jay A. Moody, 
1997], enhanced  communication, reduction in overhead, 
relaxed documentation and reduced government 
oversight 
- contractor empowerment led to the improper 
assessment of technical efficiencies which led to  
-cost estimation errors,  
- reduction in overhead led to improper cost estimation 
as the personnel were not trained in the risk factor 
analysis,  
- reduced government oversight led to improper 
coordination between the ground and flight team 
together led to unplanned changes in design and 
many estimation errors in specific technical errors 
Contractor Logistics support was considered to eliminate 
military personnel from maintaining SBIRS ground 
infrastructure 
resulted in expensive coordination problems proved as a wrong decision from the government part 
to hand over the infrastructure to contractors 
Re
qu
ire
m
en
t  
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s 
Clarity of the requirements was in question at every 
stage 
Re-requirement analysis for understanding the 
operational clarity. 
The workarounds mounted up to a stage where it 
started its Pareto-optimal tendencies resulting in 
redesign effort in 2007 
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CRIMS  was developed for technical risk assessment 
process 
technical risks were not assessed properly leading to 
unpredictability in the architecture, development, and 
test 
Led to cost overruns 
Architecture of the flight software - failure in thermal 
vacuum test in 2003 
unpredictability  
-telemetry data was lost at a halt due to hardware 
design problems 
- in the development phase, the technologies were not 
mature enough to (TRL 6) to assess 
- in the test - architectural failures 
flight software which had proven to be a complexity 
sponge as the design evolved with requirements 
clarity  
System Evaluation and Estimation of Resources to assess 
the software related technical risks 
problems of risk returns problems with quality attributes 
- maintainability,  
- testability,  
- interoperability,  
- scalability and 
- flexibility  
Failure in thermal vacuum testing (2007). 
untouchable by their own developers There seems to be a standing army guarding this core 
system 
NO EFFECT ON ACCIDENT 
Te
st 
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testing of ground segment – not in accordance with the 
military standards by SEIT 
-test team was still developing the test cases. 
-the test was not ready to accept the development 
inputs 
test architecture was not taken into account before the 
beginning of the development 
TEMP was not properly developed could not predict the technology risks undertaken by 
the development team 
Technology risk 
One single Integrated T&E plan was developed – 
software maturity 
the process was not utilized to the maximum ability the test team lacked visibility into the development 
and risk analysis 
Potential failure paths were tested such as Fault 
Detection, Diagnostics and Recovery (FDDR) for Flight 
software 
 Failure in thermal vacuum test from 2003 
Simulated realistic environment “Test as fly and fly as 
you test” was practiced to avoid 
the simulation tests had great failures due to 
workarounds implemented 
Failure in thermal vacuum test from 2003 
IHC issued interim Authority to operate inappropriately issued without proper investigation into 
the assurance capabilities 
Lost confidence in the process 
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testbeds were developed in parallel difficult to distinguish between testbeds and flight 
software issues 
-oversubscription of testbeds  
- lack of simulation resources  
- high-risk areas - the timing of stored programs - not 
tested  
system security features for HEO were found to be 
incomplete 
HEO test data to be doubted HEO capability to test, assess and support SBIRS was 
contested.  
Ground software development efforts were delayed due 
to database problems 
development and test efforts had integration and total 
performance problems 
faulty hardware and software design 
HEO P/L Single Board Computers had problems latent defects were discovered in the manufacturing 
process of HEO in integration and test sequence 
delays in the schedule 
-delays in the development had affected the test, 
which delayed further 
software development and control gyro reference 
assembly also failed during life testing in Increment 1 
ground software problems resulted in a two-year slip resulting in further postponements of delivery 
-the complexity of the technology 
Co
nt
ex
t p
ro
bl
em
s As HEO 1 for Increment 2, the sensor delivery was 
delayed by a year 
the delay was due to a first infrared sensor that had 
significant defects in flight software 
first time integration of flight software was exercised in a 
new system 
complexity in integration remaining SBIRS program at risk 
-the technology was new so the progress in the 
process could not be determined. 
SBIRS High had problems in development integration MR was depleting at a higher rate  cost and schedule variance 
GAO analysis reported challenges in assembly, 
integration, and test before the re-baseline 
schedule delays and cost overruns to meet the cost and schedule goals, some needed 
capabilities were deferred 
SBIRS High technology integration was a high risk insufficient time $2million of work was behind schedule for GEO 
-the schedule did not facilitate the delivery of the 
products leading to delays. 
Major design changes occurred to GEO late in design 
phase 
technical problems found in testing degraded sensor performance 
-enforcement of recommendations 
the failure that was repeated showing the inadequate 
enforcement 
SBIRS High critical design review with just 50% of 
design drawing was passed 
HEO 1 had continuous changes to design due cost and schedule escalations 
room for inappropriate creeps in requirements  
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the program did not invest enough time and resources in 
the basic systems engineering analysis 
Two late design changes were made to improve GEO 
satellites success- to improve operational reliability 
 
the contractor was having difficulty assessing the 
specifications of the battery 
schedule delays and increased cost 
- The design had to change after the clarity of 
requirements. 
 
limited ability to identify all technical risks 
- up to date information was not available for thorough 
technical assessments 
- interrelationships among risks were not identified 
-lack of an integrated management system 
- TSPR which removed the level of rigor in monitoring 
and assessing contractor capabilities 
- the inexperience of the staff 
- budget pressure, rushed environment and optimism 
about TSPR 
contractors had projected optimistic claims 
- inaccurate and unrealistic cost performance index 
and schedule performance index 
- inadequate information about the progress 
- Risks not mitigated before the beginning of the 
development 
-the complexity of the technology 
-barriers to proceed were not defined 
-IBR risks were rated moderate or lower 
-contractor risk assessments were either incomplete or 
over-optimistic 
contractor’s own incentive to bias the technical 
assessments 
TSPR approach had poor performance reacquired in 2002 to regain the ability to properly 
oversee and assess contractor performance 
Realignment was not done properly 
COTS were assumed to be beneficial- deemed low risk 
without in-depth analysis 
GEO bus underwent significant configuration changes 
and weight growth due to unique military requirements  
-removal of military standards and specifications 
 -quality control issues  
-serious technical problems such as HEO EMI 
problem 
Contractor oversight was not appropriately managed lack of disciplined approach to software development inadequate coordination between cost and schedule 
functions 
waivers were granted by software engineering process 
group to the software development process 
meet the cost and schedule goals increased the program risks 
-negligence to adhere to the process leading to 
problems in assessment processes 
-the process had many failures in the delivery 
mechanism 
Waivers were approved for software design to be done in 
parallel with software specification 
certain requirements have been rejected rework in design and coding 
the waiver was authorized for software unit integration 
testing to be done in parallel with formal unit testing 
formal unit testing found problems that were not found 
in development unit testing 
Rework 
- the extent to which change will cause damage to the 
mission goal 
insufficient memory margin of the on-board satellite waivers were granted continued technical complexity challenges 
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problems with acquisition policies governing basic 
system design 
latent defect and process escapes cost and schedule delays due to rework 
Technical risk assessments were underestimated due to 
immature technologies 
compressed testing schedules failures in meeting technical performance 
redesigns and reworks schedule slips and cost growths 
 
technical risks related to flight and ground software - 
first-time integration efforts were found to be of high 
risk 
Co
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HEO software development activities continued as a risk 
in GEO integration and test 
Unexpectedly difficult in HEO integration. 
variance at completion at $25.6 million and schedule 
variance of 32% whereas threshold variance was 5% 
-integration testing and operations,  
-thermal vacuum test preparation 
 -engineering rework such as Pointing and Control 
Assembly software was restructured to allow off-ramp 
option 
 
tracking algorithms and software were not complete with 
hundreds of open defects and delayed qualifications 
- accelerated ground software development 
 
- integration of GEO flight software which was high-
risk effort did not start until August 2003 
Schedule delays 
lack of coordination between ground software 
development and space 
late delivery of database and inability of program office 
to reduce the length of time taken to certify data 
processed from GEO1 
148 defective EMI frequencies- process failures, 
stringent requirements and the subcontractor did not 
implement the EMI control plan 
delayed and increased the risk Schedule delays 
-improper process 
-no clear understanding of individual contractor’s 
responsibilities, so DOD did not bother to bring in 
new processes in place 
no contractor was clearly responsible for integrating 
HEO sensor with the host bus 
-Hardware installation at the remote ground station,  
-legacy reporting system interfacing with MCS, 
-delays to start testing,  
-the requirement of testing of parallel operations prior to 
the declaration of IOC,  
-fault detection, and isolation problems 
a significant delay in performance and reliability test Schedule delays 
-lack of motivation to improve the efficiency of the 
process performance 
-Compressed timeline,  
-issues due to shared facilities at overseas relay ground 
stations,  
-delay in performance validation testing of increment 1 
ground software, 
increased risk and schedule delays and cost overruns schedule delays and cost overruns 
-the schedule was very tight and did not incorporate 
the safety cushion 
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- inadequate testbed design and scope,  
-simulation tests needed,  
-accelerated deployment of a low component in 2004,  
-significant improvement in SBIRS High requirements 
over DSP  
-inadequate HWIL testbeds 
-the decline in the defense budget, 
- consolidation of the aerospace industry  
-growing competition for the fewer programs,  
increased cost efficiency by transferring program 
responsibilities to contractors with less government 
oversight 
Building lethargy 
-did not suit the process of development. 
-efficiency was not indicated as a requirement in the 
process -acquisition reform measures eliminated the usual cost 
and technical risk assessment data recording,  
-increased technological complexity  
-reduced acquisition workforce  
challenged the knowledge to assess the technical and 
system engineering progress of the program 
-Airforce instruction 99-101 “Developmental Test and 
Evaluation” not implemented 
- SMM tool was not used to track the progress of the 
program  
- all critical test plans and reports were not signed off 
without effective management and oversight of 
development and testing, the program had the risk of 
repeating the problems identified during the program 
recertification 
Ac
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flight software in the single processor after the redesign applications in a single core processor 
- non-distributed application architecture 
-grow in complexity and would be difficult to maintain 
lower fail-safe mechanism and produces more heat 
GAO opted for redesign option effectively design flight software architecture for 
efficiently performing software 
proper mechanism to evaluate the redesign options 
GAO -sufficient evidence of the problem- oversight 
responsibility on Lockheed Martin during the trade study 
 
proper oversight on the contractors recommended this option of the redesign 
Airforce undertook requirements re-clarification effort 
along with the Lockheed Martin 
recommended this redesign option Airforce’s basis to recommend this redesign option is 
not clear. 
 
 
Program review board -assessing the architecture to the 
suitability of military requirements and recommends the 
design option 
negligence on the part of the review team to have 
recommended the redesign option 
negligence 
 
Independent review team - an independent assessment of 
design 
did not do a rigorous analysis of the design presented 
for a redesign 
oversight of the future performance problems this 
design would arise 
 
Joint Execution Team - flight software development 
- to conduct inch stone review,  
-Executive Program management  
lack of disciplined process of Lockheed Martin and 
Airforce had limited control on SBIRS program  
recommended separate program manager for flight 
software team 
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-address weaknesses including Independent Program 
Assessment recommendations on technical baselines 
 
DOD authorized to proceed with development based on 
the redesign- Joint Execution Team 
members were already players in the program mitigate problems related to the original design of 
flight software 
 
DCMA monitoring the progress of software 
development – as delays would affect the launch 
HEO software development was delayed - aggressive 
schedule  
-lack of understanding of the complexity of software 
tasks  
higher defects 
- no clarity of the basis for assessment 
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Flight software sensor - several defects in testing HEO software development is among top ten program 
risks 
Software development and integration, testing and 
assembly had problems including a sensor, pointing, 
and control assembly 
 
flight software development was significantly behind 
schedule 
rework due to a higher amount of growing defects 
- did not monitor the development schedule and the 
progress 
Air Force Requirements Oversight Council served to 
resolve operational requirements issues 
The clarity of certain operational details required was 
not detailed well. 
unplanned changes in development which led to 
increased complexity leading to growing defects 
DOD- Validation of system security features was 
incomplete 
Data which were tested in HEO capability could not be 
trusted and the facility to perform tests were also 
questionable. 
 
 
Designated Approval authority had inappropriately 
issued Interim Authority to Operate to Interim Highly 
Elliptical Orbit Capability 
This violated Department of Defence Information 
Security Certification Authority by not ensuring the 
system security features were met by conducting 
security tests. 
IHC data is considered incorrect as system security 
features such as availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality were not validated against 
SEIT maintains requirement verification Ledger which is 
used in testing 
IPT maintains software requirements specification which 
uses Requirement Traceability and Management tool for 
test verification 
Did not validate the tests properly to proceed to system 
test as the code reached the thermal vacuum testing and 
had major failures. 
 
risks to be escalated as bigger to the stage of failure 
-is no check post to evaluate the credibility of 
progress 
AFOTEC- validating the operational effectiveness and 
checks the suitability of system in a cost-effective 
manner 
the testing was not performed effectively to avoid 
major failure in thermal vacuum testing 
The failure review board had assessed some 
functionalities as risky 
the mitigation plans did not work leading to the risks 
carried further into later stages of the development 
cycle 
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Table 2: Finding of this research 
 
 
SPO - there were many failures leading to major failure 
in the delivery of flight software in thermal vacuum 
testing 
- Waivers were requested by Lockheed Martin in 
software development process 
-failures in the development process 
- These waivers evidently led to problems in design 
 
-many design changes resulting from requirement 
specification clarification activity. 
- mounting defects in the formal unit testing due to 
the code not been tested in development testing  
-heavy rework 
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Chapter IV Recommendation of accident prevention 
The context described in the above section is the moral sense of responsibility towards the 
self-image, it is an appendage to self-image by advising the action related to justified 
behavior, thereby improving self-esteem. This will, in turn, provide satisfaction to others 
which will provide evidence of supporting facts to honor the justice. It provides new meaning 
to the morale which benefits the welfare of the fellow men. This ruling of justice has to be 
executed which satisfies the wider community of the safer world.  This is the context which 
is expected for successful execution of change. 
In the case study, the context which is explicitly created for the deterrent is the cause of 
contributory negligence, the resulting context is in a state of restricted heroism with 
liabilities on individual contributions towards assumed success resulting in blaming the 
proximate cause as the failure. This factor of contributory negligence is an epidemic disease 
which is widely spreading that encourages individuals in such a context to develop double 
standards in conduct. That is one which is applied with a relaxed, subjective response which 
becomes an implicit standard. This environment of lethargy does influence the morale of the 
organizations involved to pick the pace only to see the excursion of the excitement of 
reaching the success. 
The contextual factor is molded to the organizational needs in “The Health and Safety at 
workplace” which follows the principles of the organization’s culture improvement to have 
a safe environment. This has created a widespread acceptance of principles underlying the 
accident prevention techniques. Under this, the core is to promote positive culture through a 
holistic approach – the interaction between the working environment, equipment, systems 
and procedures and the people in the organization is considered[Institution of Occupational 
Health and Safety, 2015]. The culture of safety is promoted as shared values (what is 
important) and beliefs (how things work) that interact within an organization’s structure and 
control systems to produce behavioral standards (the way we do things around 
here)[Institution of Occupational Health and Safety, 2015]. Poor working conditions/culture 
would lead to accidents. 
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The challenge is to develop a positive organizational culture, as it is hard to change the 
attitudes and beliefs of a workforce by direct persuasion which has led to the development 
of “behavioral safety” approaches[Institution of Occupational Health and Safety, 2015]. The 
culture though develops slowly, the fundamental change does take time. The positive safety 
culture has three key aspects (Figure 31), working practices and rules for effectively 
controlling hazards, a positive attitude towards risk management and compliance with the 
control processes, the capacity to learn from accidents, near misses and safety performance 
indicators that bring about continual improvement[Institution of Occupational Health and 
Safety, 2015]. 
 
Figure 31 Positive safety culture[Institution of Occupational Health and Safety, 2015] 
A maturity model for a culture2 that can help to choose the right behavioral interventions for 
the organization is shown in Figure 32 in five stages[Institution of Occupational Health and 
Safety, 2015]. 
                                                        
2 Health and Safety Executive. Evaluating the effectiveness of the Health and Safety Executive’s Health 
and Safety Climate Survey Tool (RR042). HSE Books, 002.www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/ 
rr042.pdf. 
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Figure 32 Maturity Model for safety culture[Institution of Occupational Health and Safety, 2015] 
The maturity model could be combined with principles of total quality management (Figure 
33) to build safety culture change process by assessing the current level of maturity,  
developing a plan to move to next level, then implementing the plan, monitoring the 
implementation, reassessing the level of maturity to evaluate success and again identifying 
more actions[Institution of Occupational Health and Safety, 2015]. 
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Figure 33 Total Quality Management for change process[Institution of Occupational Health and Safety, 
2015] 
The Health and Safety procedures follow similar behavioral changes in the organization as 
the context of any change in the organization’s ethos. The case study has accident cause as 
the context which is to be accommodated in order to have a successful sail of the SBIRS 
program. So this procedure of Health and Safety is recommended to ensure cultural change 
for the program to be more effective. 
 
 
Architecture Analysis  
Sujatha Mohanram Post Graduate Research 119 
Chapter V  Architecture Analysis 
The architecture of having flight software placed in one processor is the accident that is 
detailed. The flight software which was originally designed to be placed in distributed 
application architecture and in two of the four processors in onboard satellite (Figure 17). 
The redesign of architecture which is to place the flight software in one processor (Figure 
18) is to simplify the architecture than to have distributed application because it is the best 
fit with the system design. 
The architectural issues here are: 
1. Flight software on the single processor. 
Flight software on single processor means that one single processor has to bear the 
consequences of the heavy burden of applications for maintenance problems and 
issues of future development of flight software architecture. It was to solve the 
situation that of thermal vacuum testing where unexplained and unwarranted 
problems occurred due to architectural problems in the flight software, this solution 
of placing all applications on the single processor was adopted, to solve timing of 
stored programs, distribution of control between processors, and failure at the 
hardware interface level. 
2. Flight software which is not on distributed application architecture. 
Flight software which was not based on distributed application architecture was to 
be placed in single core processor. This would solve the problems by simplifying the 
architecture, developing more software, and increasing the robustness of the fault 
management system.  This was seen as best fit with component and fault 
management and system design. Although applications were componentized into 
separate applications, they were not distributed into different processors. This 
distribution of applications is based on different architectural style as the “distributed 
application architecture”. This architecture takes the advantage of maximizing the 
performance of the processor by distributing the load of the processor to the 
processors which have the applications designed to accept such performance 
distribution. 
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Single processor: The processor is responsible for logical, computational and control 
activities of the computer. The processor can be of different types: a single processor and a 
multicore processor.  
 “If we do not write programs with a special focus on running on parallel cores, we will not 
get the advantage of multicores.”[Ghuman, 2016] 
The multicore processors use two or more core to process the instructions. The advantages 
of using multicore processor are: 
 Can execute multiple instructions by using multiple cores 
 Can speed up the software which is designed for multi-core processors 
 Has higher performance depending on a number of cores, frequency and software 
application to be executed. 
“It is the single-core processors which are put together to make a multi-core 
processor.”[Ghuman, 2016] 
The decision to place the flight software application on a single processor would not take 
the advantage of the multicore processor architecture. The original design was to use a 
multicore architecture which was altered to use single core processor after the thermal 
vacuum testing.  
Distributed application architecture: Distributed applications are applications that are 
designed to run on multiple processors or computers. This architectural style advocates 
separation of concerns in the allocation of functionalities in the components. If the 
components are so designed to allocate the functionalities independently on separate 
processors, then the software is simple to understand and easier to develop and 
maintain[Fielding, 2000]. The general principle of simplicity is understood in terms of 
verifiability, usability, maintainability. Verifiability is the quality of software architecture to 
plan for the testing of functionalities, usability is the architectural quality which incorporates 
the reusability of the component in mind and maintainability is the architectural principle 
which focuses on reducing the defects and facilitates ease of maintenance.   
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Thus distributed application has the advantage of loose coupling of components which 
allows separate deployment into different processors that helps the applications to scale 
better and perform better. 
Thus the decision to place flight software on a non-distributed application framework was a 
wrong decision as it had lost the advantages of scalability, maintainability, reusability, 
verifiability and performance loss as it is not taking the advantage of the multicore processor 
architecture. 
The problem of architecture in this case study is multifold. The problem of hardware and 
software could be seen separately. The hardware side of the problem is to move from 
multicore architecture to single processor architecture. The software side of the problem is 
to move from distributed application architecture to legacy architectural style of placing all 
application components on a single processor (not distributed). 
The flight software in the current state is on the distributed architecture taking the advantage 
of latest architectural principles such as Mission Data Systems and core flight software 
architecture.    
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Conclusion 
The SBIRS case study was conducted based on the reports from GAO and DOD. These 
reports were for the period of 15 years. The analysis was done on decisions taken, statements 
from various other organizations involved that had influenced this accident. The reports from 
GAO and DOD did record the failure, this was not considered as an accident. So no further 
analysis was conducted thus far. This analysis was based on a failure which was not analyzed 
as the cause of the failures that followed pace. 
At the onset of the reports from DOD and GAO, did point the failure in the architectural 
principle of moving from the distributed application architecture and multicore architecture 
to a non-distributed application architecture and single processor. Although this did seem as 
a wrong decision this analysis was convinced that NASA would not consider such an option. 
So a thorough analysis of the entire program was conducted to understand the circumstances 
in which such a decision had to be taken. 
As the program had started in 1996, gathering evidence of all the decisions made was 
impossible. This analysis has collected all the relevant facts that could be related to the 
accident in this program. This information was validated for its correctness and completeness 
with the GAO Assistant Director who was involved in this program from the inception. The 
confirmation from the Assistant Director of GAO is in the Appendix (Report 1, Report 2).  
All the failures were analyzed, all the organizations involved were identified and 
consequences of the failures were understood to create an understanding of the entire picture 
of the accident. As the failures were distributed laterally there was no clear line of hierarchy 
found in the structural analysis of the accident. So STAMP methodology was adopted for its 
loose adherence to hierarchical structures. This advantage was taken as a positive measure 
to adapt SBIRS accident to STAMP analysis.  The failures were grouped under the 
organizations and organization’s interactions were analyzed. The relationship between the 
failures was understood based on the consequences which escalated to form bigger failures. 
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STAMP was implemented in SBIRS accident, the STAMP methodology follows systematic 
elimination process of identifying the failures and organizations that had contributed to the 
interaction failures that STAMP prides in projecting it out as the consequence of the accident 
analysis. In the first phase of STAMP analysis, DOD was identified as the culprit, whereas 
the situation changed after analyzing the progressive phases of the accident to GAO and 
DOD being identified as organizations responsible for the accident. With the dynamic 
positioning of failures and cumulative positioning of the progressive accident, it was 
understood that problem lies with the context in which all organizations were operating.  
This realization was enlightening as the STAMP has brought out the true self of the accident 
cause. 
The context as the cause of the accident had been of great influence in other accidents in 
various other organizations. This cause of the accident has never been considered as an 
accident ‘context’ from the onset of any accident analysis. So this analysis suggests context 
be considered as one of the factors responsible for methodical analysis of an accident. 
STAMP analysis is improved to consider context as one of the core principles of accident 
analysis. 
The accidents which were reported were analyzed for prevention techniques, there were no 
techniques advised in any accident analysis this far for context as the cause of the accident. 
There is an attempt made to formulate a prevention technique by introducing the context as 
a factor to be controlled to prevent accidents in this case study. This could be done by using 
HSE process. 
The accident in the case study is to determine the cause of failure, the decision taken by 
choosing a wrong architecture which was to place the flight software on one single processor 
that would not take advantage of both the distributed application architecture and a multicore 
processor. It is seen as the cause of the systemic failure than an isolated decision failure.  The 
cause of this wrong decision was due to inertia built into the system over time to bear with 
anything that was thrown at it – a numbness which will anchor deep into the system. 
As we have seen the wrong decision so taken was not the actual accident, the accident was 
built in over the years. This wrong decision is only the highlight of the accident. The accident 
was a loss of time and money in this program over 15 year’s period. The loss was 
unaccounted for, a hidden factor which no one can actually explain. So the context is chosen 
to be blamed here. 
Conclusion  
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The STAMP, accident analysis process is commended for its procedural direction towards 
this outcome. The outcome though was shocking as all the organizations and all the 
interactions had resulted in such a realization which stands still as a mystery for many 
decades of the guilt of being hostile in living with it than to have taken preventive measures 
to avoid future accidents.  As there seems to be no preventive action that could be suggested 
even at this stage which was successful in preventing accidents with context as a causal 
factor. 
This analysis has contributed towards analyzing the accidents that were not considered as 
accidents as the end result had been successful. Such accidents go unnoticed but would have 
contributed towards the failure of the mission by delays and cost overruns. It is required now 
in this era to understand progressive phases of accidents before it culminates to be an 
accident. This case study has analyzed the progressive accident to learn from it so that the 
end result of the program could be altered. This case study has analyzed the accident for the 
period of 15 years. As the organizations are procedural and systematic, the interactions are 
structured in the military environment, this case study was chosen for its merits. STAMP 
methodology was used in analyzing the case study for understanding the progressive 
accidents to identify prevention techniques before the accident disrupts the mission. An 
improvement in the STAMP methodology was suggested and a process to suit the STAMP 
improvement was suggested for preventive accident analysis. 
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Recommendations for Future Work 
The effectiveness of software depends on factors such as an underlying formal model 
(ambiguity can be avoided); compositional capabilities (safety properties of components); a 
system modelling approach; sufficient effective power to capture common failure scenarios; 
automation support for accident analysis[Wu and Kelly, 2005]. 
“Software architecture addresses software issues such as flexibility and development costs 
by providing an abstract model of a system in terms of software elements that have externally 
visible properties and their interactions”[Wu and Kelly, 2005]. 
Failure modelling of software architecture was attempted by using Communicating 
Sequential Process (CSP) language[Wu and Kelly, 2005]. In CSP, a basic unit is an event, 
and the building block is a process representing a pattern of event sequences[Wu and Kelly, 
2005]. The failure behavior considers processes of each component[Wu and Kelly, 2005]. 
The architectural views are modelled in this failure modelling framework to isolate 
functional failures and hardware failures[Wu and Kelly, 2005]. The main focus of failure 
modeling would be the definition of failure behavior of elementary components[Wu and 
Kelly, 2005]. 
There is a realization that the same architectural problems are repeated over and over again 
in many organizations. All organizations have their own evolution of architecture to solve 
their problems. It is thought that there should be common lessons learned to build a 
framework incorporating the common evolution of architecture. The next phase would be to 
standardize this evolved framework. It is proposed that a “blueprint for software 
architecture” will bring common lessons learned into a framework that could be 
standardized.  Hoping to progress towards recommending an appropriate model in this in 
future. Daniel Dvorak chief technologist in NASA has invited in the flight software 
complexity project where this idea would be progressed. 
The cause of the accident is the “context” in which the organizations function.  The accident 
analysis is undertaken to understand and prevent the accidents from repeating. In this case 
study, it was analyzed that the context is an additional factor that should be taken into 
consideration. The prevention of accident due to context is still unknown. This could be 
considered as future work. It has been progressed by feeding the context to the organizations. 
This idea will be progressed in Daniel Dvorak’s, NASA - flight software complexity project. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Report 1: GAO Assistant Director, familiarity with the SBIRS program 
 
 
Report 2 : Assistant Director, GAO- Confirmation statement on SBIRS project
 Sujatha Mohanram Post Graduate Research 127 
Reference 
DOD. Development Testing of Space Based Infrared System Mission- Critical Software. 
[Online]. Office of the Inspector General, 2003. Available 
at:http://www.dodig.mil/Audit/reports/fy04/04-022.pdf. 
Dvorak, Daniel L. NASA Study on Flight Software Complexity. [Online]. NASA Ofice of 
Chief Engineer, 2009. Available at:doi:10.2514/6.2009-1882. 
Evans, Ben. Atlas V Carrying the SBIRS GEO ­ 2 Satellite Launches Successfully. 
[Online]. Wired4Space, no. March, 2013 pp. 1–9. Available 
at:http://www.wired4space.com/space/atlas-v-with-sbirs-geo-2-satellite-ready-for-
launch. 
Feller, PH, D Gluch, and K Woodham. Case Study: Model-Based Analysis of the Mission 
Data System Reference Architecture. [Online], no. May, 2010. Available 
at:http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA
528582. 
Fielding, Roy Thomas. Architectural Styles and the Design of Network-Based Software 
Architectures. [Online]. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE, 2000. Available 
at:https://www.ics.uci.edu/~fielding/pubs/dissertation/fielding_dissertation.pdf. 
GAO. Despite Restructuring , SBIRS High Program Remains at Risk of Cost and Schedule 
Overruns. [Online], 2003. Available at:www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-48. 
GAO. Space Based Infrared System High Program and Its Alternative. [Online], 2007. 
Available at:http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1088R. 
GAO. DOD ’ S Goals for Resolving Space Based Infrared System Software Problems Are 
Ambitious. [Online], 2008. Available at:http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081073.pdf. 
Ghuman, Sukhdev Singh. Comparison of Single-Core and Multi-Core Processor. [Online] 
6 (6), 2016 pp. 423–24. 
Institution of Occupational Health and Safety. Promoting a Positive Culture. [Online]. 
 Sujatha Mohanram Post Graduate Research 128 
IOSH, no. May, 2015 pp. 1–16. Available at:www.iosh.co.uk/positiveculture. 
Jay A. Moody, Major. Achieving Affordable Operational Requirements on the Space Based 
Infrared System (SBIRS) Program: A Model for Warfighter and Acquision Success. 
[Online]. Air Command and Staff College, 1997. Available 
at:http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA
397934.  
Leveson, Nancy. A New Accident Model for Engineering Safer Systems. [Online]. Safety 
Science 42 (4), 2004 pp. 237–70. Available at:doi:10.1016/S0925-7535(03)00047-X. 
Leveson, Nancy. A Safer World. [Online]. Chemistry and Industry (London) 77 (8), 2011 
pp. 42–45. Available at:doi:10.1002/cind.7708-14.x. 
Leveson, Nancy, Mirna Daouk, Nicolas Dulac, and Karen Marais. Applying STAMP in 
Accident Analysis. [Online]. NASA Conference Publication, 2003, 177–98. Available 
at:http://esd.mit.edu/WPS/esd-wp-2003-02.pdf. 
LockheedMartin. First SBIRS Satellite Exceeding Performance Expectations After One 
Year on Orbit. [Online]. Lockheed Martin Media, no. June 5, 2012. Available 
at:http://www.lockheedmartin.co.uk/us/news/press-releases/2012/june/0605-ss-
sbirs.html. 
Mccaney, Kevin. Air Force Awards $ 1 . 86B Contract for next Two SBIRS Satellites. 
[Online]. C4ISR, no. 25 June, 2014 pp. 1–7. Available 
at:https://defensesystems.com/articles/2014/06/25/air-force-lockheed-sbris-satellite-
contract.aspx. 
Mccomas, David. NASA / GSFC ’ S Flight Software Core Flight System. [Online], 2012. 
Available at:http://docplayer.net/41145319-Nasa-gsfc-s-flight-software-core-flight-
system.html. 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. Status of the Space Based Infrared System Program. 
[Online]. Defense and Intelligence Committees of the Congress of the United States, 
2005. Available at:http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB235/42.pdf. 
Qureshi, Zahid H. A Review of Accident Modelling Approaches for Complex Critical 
 Sujatha Mohanram Post Graduate Research 129 
Sociotechnical Systems. [Online]. 12th Australian Workshop on Safety Related 
Programmable Systems (SCS’07), Adelaide 86, 2008 pp. 47–59. Available 
at:http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA482543. 
SBIRS. Space-Based Infrared System ( SBIRS ). [Online]. Airforce Programs, no. 
December, 2013 pp. 297–98. Available 
at:http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2013/pdf/af/2013sbirs.pdf. 
Song, Yao. Applying System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) to Hazard 
Analysis. [Online], 2012. Available 
at:https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/bitstream/11375/11867/1/fulltext.pdf. 
Spence, Author Rob. Thought Leadership The Importance of Organisational Leadership 
Thought Leadership The Importance of Organisational Leadership. [Online], no. 6, 
2009. Available at:https://www.bainessimmons.com/wp-content/uploads/importance-
of-organisational-leadership.pdf. 
Toolbook, The Quality, Colossal Iceberg, Breaks Away We, Iceberg Larsen, and Pope 
Francis. Food Quality Mgmt . System Food Quality Mgmt . System. [Online], 2017, 1–
3. Available at:http://www.syque.com/quality_tools/toolbook/toolbook.htm. 
Wu, Weihang, and Tim Kelly. Failure Modelling in Software Architecture Design for 
Safety. [Online]. Proceedings of the 2005 Workshop on Architecting Dependable 
Systems, 2005, 1–7. Available at:doi:10.1145/1082983.1083222. 
Younossi, Obaid, Mark A. Lorell, Kevin Brancato, Cynthia R. Cook, Mel Eisman, Bernard 
Fox, John Graser, Yool Kim, and Robert S. Leonard. Improving the Cost Estimation 
of Space Systems: Past Lessons and Future Recommendations. [Online]. RAND 
Project Airforce, 2008. Available 
at:http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG690.pdf 
Zacks. Lockheed Martin Clinches $1.9B GEO-5 and GEO-6 Satellite Contract. [Online]. 
NASDAQ, no. June 25, 2014 pp. 1–3. Available 
at:http://m.nasdaq.com/article/lockheed-martin-clinches-19b-geo-5-and-geo-6-
satellite-contract---analyst-blog-cm365006.  
